从内在批判到哲学人类学——哈贝马斯实证主义批判中研究方法的转变  

From Immanent Criticism to Philosophical Anthropology:The Shift of Research Methods in Habermas’s Criticism of Positivism

作　　者：郑召利[1] 杨建伟 ZHENG Zhao-li;YANG Jian-wei

机构地区：[1]复旦大学当代国外马克思主义研究中心、哲学学院,上海200433 [2]复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433

出　　处：《求是学刊》2024年第2期27-35,共9页Seeking Truth

摘　　要：在20世纪60年代德国社会学界开启的关于实证主义的争论中,哈贝马斯一开始明确追随阿多诺,并采取一种内在批判的时域对实证主义展开批判。随着论战的深入,哈贝马斯的观点逐渐倾向于一种哲学人类学的视角。这一转变过程反映出哈贝马斯尝试突破法兰克福学派第一代理论家的方法,进而构建自己版本的社会批判理论。这种转变尽管为哈贝马斯开启了新的语用学研究领域,并且导向交往行为理论的形成,但是内在批判的抛弃使得哈贝马斯的批判理论丧失了历史性的原则。In the debate on positivism opened in German sociology in the 1960s,Habermas at first explicitly followed Adorno and adopted a kind of inner critique of the time domain to positivism.As the polemic pro-gressed,Habermas’s views gradually tended towards a philosophical anthropological perspective.This process of transformation reflects Habermas’s attempt to break away from the approach of the first generation of Frank-furt School theorists and thus construct his own version of social critical theory.While this shift opened up new areas of discursive research for Habermas and led to the formation of a theory of interactional behaviour,the abandonment of intrinsic critique deprived Habermas’s critical theory of the principle of historicity.

关 键 词：内在批判 实证主义批判 哲学人类学 历史性原则 

分 类 号：B516.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]