高管激励与企业过度金融化:路径机制与实证考察  

Executive Incentives and Firm Over-financialization:Path Mechanism and Empirical Investigation

作　　者：徐美玲 XU Meiling(Economics College,Fujian Normal University,Fuzhou 350108,China)

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学经济学院,福州350108

出　　处：《科技和产业》2024年第9期47-53,共7页Science Technology and Industry

摘　　要：近年来,我国企业为获取超额收益而过度配置金融资产,导致金融投资规模不断增加,出现企业过度金融化现象。高管激励作为一种中长期激励机制,能够弱化股东与高管的利益冲突,影响企业过度金融化水平。为此,以2011—2021年我国A股上市公司作为样本,研究高管激励对企业过度金融化的路径机制并进行实证考察。研究发现,高管激励能显著抑制企业过度金融化的行为,股权集中度会弱化上述负相关关系,同时非国有企业的抑制效果比国有企业更显著。In recent years,Chinese enterprises have over-allocated financial assets in order to obtain excess returns,resulting in an increasing scale of financial investment and excessive financialization of enterprises.As a medium-and long-term incentive mechanism,executive incentives can weaken the conflict of interests between shareholders and executives,affect the level of excessive financialization of enterprises.Based on this,China’s A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021 are taken as a sample to study the path mechanism of executive incentives on the excessive financialization of enterprises and conducts an empirical investigation.Empirical evidence shows that executive incentives can significantly inhibit the excessive financialization of enterprises,and equity concentration weakens the above negative correlation,and the inhibitory effect of non-state-owned enterprises is more significant than that of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：高管激励 过度金融化 实证考察 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] F832