碳配额与交易机制对制造商渠道入侵策略的影响  

Research on Manufacturer's Channel Encroachment Strategy Considering Carbon Cap-and-Trade Regulation

作　　者：蒋昙飞 石纯来 谢永平[1] 聂佳佳[2] JIANG Tanfei;SHI Chunlai;XIE Yongping;NIE Jiajia(School of Economics&Management,Xidian University,Xi'an 710126;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2024年第4期879-895,共17页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72201202);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(22YJC630116);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划项目(2022JQ-744,2022JQ-742);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金(2021A1515110865);陕西省社会科学基金项目(2022R007);西安市科技计划软科学研究项目(22RKYJ0036)资助课题。

摘　　要：在平台经济快速发展的当今,越来越多的制造商开通直销渠道以迎合消费者线上购物需求.制造商开通直销渠道加剧了渠道间竞争,尽管有助于提升产品需求量,但会侵蚀零售商的市场份额,也可能增加制造商的碳排放总量.尤其是在碳配额与交易机制下,碳排放量总量的增加导致制造商通过碳交易市场购买超出碳排放限额的碳排放量随之增加,进而增加制造商碳成本.基于此,借助博弈论构建制造商和零售商间的两级供应链模型,探究碳配额与交易机制对制造商渠道入侵策略的影响.研究发现,尽管制造商总是倾向于开通直销渠道,但是否增加碳排放总量以及是否侵蚀零售商利润取决于碳交易价格和制造商碳减排成本系数.具体而言:1)对零售商而言,当碳交易价格较高且碳减排成本系数较小时,制造商开通直销渠道渠会增加零售商利润;否则,制造商开通直销渠道仍会侵蚀零售商利润;2)对碳排放总量而言,当碳减排成本系数较小时,制造商开通直销渠道降低碳排放总量;当碳减排成本系数较大时,制造商开通直销渠道增加碳排放总量.此外,文章也探究了在何种情形下,制造商开通直销渠道既增加零售商利润,也能降低碳排放总量.With the rapid development of the platform economy,more and more manufacturers sell the products through their own channels(i.e.,the direct channel)besides the retailers(the indirect one),i.e.,the dual-channel supply chain.Traditional wisdoms also refer to the dual-channel as the manufacturer encroachment,endowing manufacturers with absolute control over prices.Intuitively,one finds the manufacturer can have more carbon emission,which increases the manufacturer's purchase cost of carbon emissions(i.e.,carbon cost) because of the increasing sales with channel competition,especially under the carbon cap-and-trade,namely channel competition effect.On the other hand,the research and development(R&D) cost per the unit product of the carbon reduction can be alleviated due to channel competition,which results in the lower unit carbon mission and wholesale price,namely,spillover effect.Motivated by the observations,we employ a Stackelberg game between a manufacturer(she) and a retailer(he) to explore the manufacturer's channel decisions under carbon cap-and-trade.It shows that the manufacturer always has an incentive to develop the direct channel.Counterintuitively,whether the manufacturer's carbon emissions in the dual-channel supply chain are higher than that in the single channel one depends on the manufacturer's reduction cost in carbon emission.To be specific,when the manufacturer's reduction cost in carbon emission is low,her carbon emission in the dual-channel supply chain is lower than that in the single channel;Otherwise,her carbon emission in the dual-channel supply chain is higher.For the retailer,he can benefit from the manufacturer encroachment.When the carbon price is high and the manufacturer's reduction cost in carbon emission is low,the retailer benefits from the manufacturer encroachment;Otherwise,his profit in the dual-channel supply chain is lower.In addition,we identify the region in which the retailer's profit is higher and the carbon emission is lower in the dual channel supply chain than those in

关 键 词：碳配额与交易 渠道竞争效应 溢出效应 直销渠道 碳成本 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F830.9[经济管理—金融学] F274