康德道德形而上学中的自由概念  

The Concept of Freedom in Kant’s Moral Metaphysics

作　　者：宋清华 蒋琬欣 SONG Qinghua;JIANG Wanxin(School of Marxism,Henan University of Science and Technology,Luoyang 471023,China)

机构地区：[1]河南科技大学马克思主义学院,河南洛阳471023

出　　处：《河南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第3期15-21,共7页Journal of Henan University of Science & Technology(Social science)

基　　金：河南省社科规划基金项目(2020BZX011)。

摘　　要：自由是康德道德哲学中的重要概念,这一概念在其不同的哲学著作中也存在着一定的差别:前批判时期,康德视自由为出自内在原因的行为,并拒斥决定论;第一批判又强化了这一立场,强调自由不是由自然法则规定的,但也无法证明其存在;在《道德形而上学的奠基》里,康德认为可在根本上证明自由的存在,进而证明道德法则适用于我们;在第二批判中,康德认为我们能够从人出于义务且必然地服从道德法则的事实证明意志自由的存在;在《单纯理性限度内的宗教》中,康德不再证明自由意志的存在问题,而是视其存在意味着人类恶的不可逃避性,以及人类弃恶向善的必然性问题。但康德最终也没有证明自由的存在,并且留下了一些难题。Freedom is an important concept in Kant’s moral philosophy,and this concept also has certain differences in his different philosophical works.In the pre-critical period,Kant regarded freedom as an act of internal reasons and rejected determinism.In the first criticism,he strengthened this position,emphasizing that freedom is not regulated by natural laws,but it cannot prove its existence.In Foundation,Kant believes that it can fundamentally prove the existence of freedom,and then prove that the moral law applies to us.In the second criticism,he believed that the fact that we can irrefutably obey the moral law from the obligation of man proves the existence of freedom of will.In“Religion”,Kant no longer proved the existence of free will,but regarded its existence as the inevitable problem of human evil and the inevitability of human abandoning evil to good.But Kant did not prove the existence of freedom in the end,and left some problems.

关 键 词：康德 自由 道德法则 理性 

分 类 号：B081[哲学宗教—哲学理论]