并购防御机制与上市公司违规--催化剂还是减压阀  

Corporate M&A Defense Mechanism and Public Company Fraud:Catalyst or Decompression

作　　者：许金花[1] 戴媛媛 王彩萍[2,3] XU Jinhua;DAI Yuanyuan;WANG Caiping(School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520,China;Advanced Institute of Finance,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China;International School of Business&Finance,Sun Yat-sen University,Zhuhai 519082,China)

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520 [2]中山大学高级金融研究院,广东广州510275 [3]中山大学国际金融学院,广东珠海519082

出　　处：《财经论丛》2024年第6期57-67,共11页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(72132010);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072042)。

摘　　要：本文基于中国控制权市场激活的时代背景,采用部分可观测的Probit模型,从内部章程条款制定的视角,探究了公司并购防御与违规的关系,提出并购防御影响公司违规的“催化剂”效应和“减压阀”效应。并基于2006—2018年沪深两市A股上市公司的数据对并购防御机制与公司违规的关系进行了实证检验,结果表明,公司并购防御主要通过“催化剂”效应影响公司违规。机制检验发现,并购防御机制通过减少市场关注、削弱市场的威慑作用以及增强管理层权力导致公司违规行为的增加,进一步支持了并购防御影响公司违规的“催化剂”效应。Based on the background of the activation of the control market in China,this paper employs a Bivariate Probit model with partial observability to explore the relationship between corporate M&A defense and fraud from the perspective of internal regulation formulation.It proposes the“catalyst”effect and“decompression”effect of corporate defense affecting cor-porate fraud,and empirically tests the relationship between corporate M&A defense mechanism and corporate fraud based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2018.The empirical results show that corporate M&A defense mechanism affects corporate fraud mainly through the“catalyst”effect.Mechanism tests find that corporate M&A defense mechanism leads to an increase in corporate fraud by reducing market attention,weakening market deterrence,and empowering the management,which further support the“catalyst effect”of corporate M&A defense on corporate fraud.This study provides a new perspective on research related to corporate fraud.Existing studies on corporate fraud mainly focus on exploring the motivations for fraud or the effects of third-party intervention on fraud,neglecting the important external governance mechanism of the company control rights market.With the gradual activation of the control rights market,as one of the external governance mechanisms for companies,how does the implementation of corporate defense by companies impact corporate fraud?This study explores the above question,providing a new perspective for research related to violations.Second-ly,it enriches existing research on corporate defense,discovering new pathways through which the control rights market influ-ences company behavior.Existing research on the relationship between corporate defense and corporate governance has not reached a unified conclusion and mainly focuses on exploring the relationship between corporate defense and company value,company performance,and investor protection.This study,by examining the relationship betwee

关 键 词：公司违规 并购防御 外部接管压力 控制权市场 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]