多主体参与下食品安全社会共治演化博弈稳定性  

Stability of Food Safety Social Co-governance Evolutionary Game with Multi-agent Participation

作　　者：杨松[1] 张言彩[1] 王爱峰[2] Yang Song;Zhang Yancai;Wang Aifeng(Business School,Huaiyin Normal University,Huaian 23001,China;School of Mathematical Science,Huaiyin Normal University,Huaian 23001,China)

机构地区：[1]淮阴师范学院商学院,江苏淮安223001 [2]淮阴师范学院数学与统计学院,江苏淮安223001

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第4期325-334,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL177)。

摘　　要：食品安全关系人民群众身体健康和生命安全,党的二十大报告提出强化食品药品安全监管。针对食品市场由于信息不对称导致的市场失灵问题,本文构建了由地方政府、食品企业和公众组成的演化博弈模型,利用复制动态方程分析了不同情形下系统的均衡点和演化稳定策略,并进行数值仿真分析。结果表明:在食品安全社会共治博弈系统中存在三个稳定的均衡策略,系统演化均衡随着食品企业违规收益、政府惩罚强度和政府对公众奖励的变化而向不同稳定均衡策略演进。政府惩罚强度、政府监管成本和食品企业违规收益是影响参与主体行为演化路径的主要因素。三个稳定的均衡策略分别对应于我国食品安全治理体系演变的不同阶段。为了缓解食品安全治理风险,政府要加大惩罚力度,降低监管成本,加强企业自律,引导公众参与治理,构建多元主体相互协调的社会共治格局。Food safety is related to people's health and life safety,and the 2Oth report of the Communist Party of China proposes to strengthen food and drug safety supervision.On the one hand,information asymmetry leads to market failure,on the other hand,China's food enterprises are generally characterized by small scale,a large number,and low concentration,which also leads to government supervision failure.Therefore,in the case of market failure and government failure,third-party supervision is needed.Food safety involves multiple stakeholders,each of which has its interest demands,and there are often contradictions and conflicts among dif-ferent stakeholders.So,how do different stakeholders choose strategies in food safety governance?Can they achieve the desired stable equilibrium?How do different game players dynamically adjust their equilibrium strategies?A game model composed of local government,food enterprises,and the public is built.Secondly,the equilibrium point and evolutionary stability strategy of the system under different situations are analyzed by using the replicative dynamic equation.Then,numerical simulation is used to verify the stability strategies in the three situations,the influence of different initial states on the system evolution results is analyzed,and the influence of the change of main parameter values on the evolution path of each participant is also analyzed.The results show that there are three stable equilibrium strategies in the social co-governance game system of food safety,and the system evolution equilibrium evolves to different stable equilibrium strategies with the change of illegal profits of food enterprises,government punishment intensity,and government reward to the public.The intensity of government punishment,the cost of government supervision,and the illegal profits of food enterprises are the main factors that affect the evolution path of participants'behavior.The three stable equilibrium strategies correspond to different stages of the evolution of China's food safety gove

关 键 词：食品安全 社会共治 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]