国有企业战略投资与CEO薪酬的非对称设计  

Strategic investment and asymmetric design of CEO compensation in state-owned enterprises

作　　者：朱赛林 刘春林[1] ZHU Sailin;LIU Chunlin(Business School,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《中国软科学》2024年第5期122-131,共10页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72072085)。

摘　　要：国有企业战略投资对于满足国家战略发展需求,推动国有企业高质量发展具有重要作用。然而,战略投资会给国有企业带来高昂的代理成本,需要有效的激励约束机制保障战略投资的活力和效率。从CEO薪酬设计的角度发现,国有企业战略投资对CEO薪酬绩效敏感性的影响存在非对称性:与绩效上升时相比,绩效下降时国有企业战略投资对CEO薪酬绩效敏感性的影响更强。这说明,国有企业对于战略投资的CEO薪酬设计呈现出重约束、轻激励的特征。异质性分析表明,通过减少政府的干预、拉长控制链能在一定程度上引发国有企业激励效应(针对战略投资)的薪酬设计。研究结果对于优化国有企业战略投资的薪酬设计、促进国有企业高质量发展具有启示意义。Strategic investment by SOEs plays an important role in meeting national strategic development needs and promoting high-quality development of SOEs.However,strategic investment can bring high agency costs to SOEs,and effective incentive and constraint mechanisms are needed to guarantee the vigor and efficiency of strategic investment.From the perspective of CEO compensation design,this paper finds that there is asymmetry in the effect of SOEs strategic investment on CEO compensation performance sensitivity.The effect of SOEs strategic investment on CEO pay performance sensitivity is stronger when performance is declining compared to when performance is rising.This suggests that the design of CEO compensation for strategic investment in SOEs exhibits characteristics that stress constraints over incentives.The heterogeneity analysis suggests that the incentive effect(for strategic investment)of compensation design in SOEs can be triggered to some extent by reducing government intervention and lengthening the chain of control.The findings of this paper have implications for optimizing the compensation design for strategic investment in SOEs and promoting the high-quality development of SOEs.

关 键 词：国有企业 战略投资 薪酬绩效敏感性 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]