上市公司员工持股计划的“双刃剑”效应研究:基于公司不当行为的视角  

Research on the“double-edged sword”effect of employee stock ownership plan in listed companies:From the perspective of corporate misconduct

作　　者：马奔 仇勇[2] MA Ben;QIU Yong(School of Accounting,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China;Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070 [2]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048

出　　处：《中国软科学》2024年第6期190-201,共12页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“团队断层视角下研发团队人才评价机制重构与创新绩效持续提升路径研究”(19CGL028)。

摘　　要：员工持股计划有助于企业保留核心科技人才,激发企业创新,对形成新质生产力与推进新型工业化皆具有重要意义,但在政策实施的过程中应警惕上市公司利用这一激励手段达成不当目的。基于2014-2023年中国上市公司A股的数据,实证检验了员工持股计划与公司不当行为之间的关系。研究结果表明,上市公司在员工持股计划持续期内发生不当行为的概率更高。其原因:一是部分员工持股计划沦为变向的高管绩效式激励工具,二是员工出于自身利益发挥了合谋掩饰作用。进一步研究发现存续期较短、由金融机构代管、存在杠杆融资及激励人数处于特定区间的员工持股计划与公司不当行为的正相关关系更加显著。类似于高管绩效式激励的“双刃剑”效应同样存在于员工激励中。基于此,提出针对性的建议实现对上市公司的强监管,以保障更好的政策效果进而提高上市公司质量。Employee stock ownership plans help companies retain core technological talents,stimulate corporate innovation,and are of great significance for promoting new industrialization.Based on the panel data of A-shares of Chinese listed companies from 2014 to 2023,this paper empirically examines the relationship between employee stock ownership plans and corporate misconducts.Results of the study indicate that listed companies that implement employee stock ownership plans have a higher propensity to violate regulations.One of the reasons for this phenomenon is that employee stock ownership plans may have been turned into a performance-based incentive tool by executives,and second,the employees play the role of collusion and concealment out of their own interests.Further research finds that employee stock ownership plans with shorter durations,managed by financial institutions,leveraged financing and a smaller range of number of incentives have a more significant positive correlation with corporate misconducts.The“double-edged sword”effect similar to executive performance-based incentives also exists in employee incentives,especially in short-term and speculative employee incentives.Based on this,we finally put forward targeted suggestions to implement strong supervision of listed companies to ensure better policy effects and improve the quality of listed companies.

关 键 词：员工激励 高管激励 员工持股计划 公司不当行为 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F832[经济管理—国民经济]