随机产出与随机需求下供应链信用保证融资决策  

Credit Guarantee Financing in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Random Yield and Random Demand

作　　者：李莉英 沈丽 李小兵 刘光安 LI Li-ying;SHEN Li;LI Xiao-bing;LIU Guang-an(College of Mathematics and Statistics,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学数学与统计学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2024年第4期18-28,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：针对制造商融资难的问题,建立了随机产出与随机需求情形下由供应链下游企业零售商提供信用保证的银行融资模型.研究表明:随着零售商的信用保证比例的增加,银行的最优利率减少,制造商的最优生产投入量增加,而产品的最优采购价格降低.并且,当零售商的信用保证水平达到一个阈值时,制造商能够取得无资金约束下的最优生产水平.算例分析表明,零售商的信用保证能够提升资金约束供应链的整体绩效.To solve financing dificulties of capital-constrained manufacturers,this study considers a supply chain finance system in which the downstream enterprise,the retailer,provides a credit guarantee for the manufacturer's bank financing.The customer demand and the yield of the manufacturer are both assumed to be random.We formulate a sequential non-cooperative game model where the lending bank acts as a leader,the retailer acts as a subleader,and the manufacturer acts as the follower.The analytical model shows that when the retailer's credit guarantee proportion increases,the bank's optimal interest rate decreases,the capital-constrained manufacturer's optimal production quantity increases,and the optimal procurement price determined by the retailer decreases.We further conclude that there exists a credit guarantee threshold for the manufacturer to choose bank financing to achieve the production quantity in the channel without capital constraint.Finally,we perform a numerical analysis for illustrative and comparative purposes,and verify that the retailer's credit guarantee is beneficial for improving channel performance.

关 键 词：资金约束 随机产出 随机需求 信用保证 银行融资 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F832.4[经济管理—国民经济]