乔伊斯道德虚构主义的“虚构”所在  

The Essence of Fiction in Joyce’s Moral Fictionalism

作　　者：雷蕾 徐瑾[1] Lei Lei;Xu Jin(School of Philosophy,Hubei University,Wuhan 430062)

机构地区：[1]湖北大学哲学学院,武汉430062

出　　处：《西部学刊》2024年第12期168-172,共5页Journal of Western

摘　　要：乔伊斯的道德虚构主义思想与麦凯的道德错误论一样认为客观的道德事实或道德属性是不存在的,道德判断可能是非真非假,道德陈述所表达的断言和信念系统统一为假。基于演化视角对道德的论证可看出,乔伊斯认为道德判断是无法获得合理性论证的。然而针对道德在人们的生活实践当中的作用是不能被忽视的,乔伊斯提出道德“有用性”虚构的立场,肯定道德陈述具有真值条件,并不是作出断言或者道德信念的表达,是对道德实践的一种变革。Joyce’s moral fictionalism,like Mackie’s moral error theory,thinks that objective moral facts or moral attributes don’t exist,that moral judgment is probably neither true nor false,and the assertion and belief system of morality expressed in moral statements are all false.Based on the moral argumentation from the perspective of evolution,Joyce argues that moral judgments cannot be justified.However,as for the fact that the role of morality in people’s life practice cannot be neglected,Joyce raises a stance of the fiction of moral“usefulness”,affirming that moral statements have the condition of truth and that they are not expressions of assertions or moral beliefs but a kind of transformation of moral practice.

关 键 词：元伦理学 道德错误论 虚构 有用性虚构 道德虚构 实践合理性 

分 类 号：B82-066[哲学宗教—伦理学]