基于让步博弈方法的中美贸易关税的动态博弈分析  

Dynamic game analysis of China-US trade tariffs based on concession game methodd

作　　者：潘素娟 李时银[2] PAN Sujuan;LI Shiyin(College of Information Engineering Fujian Business University,Fuzhou 350012 China;School of Mathematical Sciences Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]福建商学院信息工程学院,福州350012 [2]厦门大学数学科学学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《延边大学学报（自然科学版）》2024年第1期92-100,共9页Journal of Yanbian University（Natural Science Edition）

基　　金：福建省自然科学基金(2021J011253);福建省社会科学基金(FJ2021B031)。

摘　　要：基于让步博弈的方法,对中美贸易双边关税问题进行了动态博弈分析,并建立了一个中美贸易双边关税的市场模型.研究表明,在让步规则的前提下,贸易双方不需要合约就可得到不少于最大输赢同酬出标的最优出标,以及得到让步均衡下的两国支付函数.该结果可为各贸易国之间的关税调整提供参考.Based on the concession game method,a dynamic game analysis was conducted on the bilateral tariff issue of China-US trade,and a market model for bilateral tariffs on China-US trade was established.The study shows that under the premise of concession rules,the trading parties can obtain an optimal bid that is not less than the maximum win or loss equal reward without the need for a contract,and can also obtains the payment function of the two countries under concession equilibrium that is better than Nash equilibrium.This result can provide references for tariff adjustments among trading countries.

关 键 词：中美贸易 纳什均衡 让步均衡 动态博弈 回归分析 

分 类 号：O175[理学—数学] F830.9[理学—基础数学]