业绩型股权激励、行权条件与企业ESG表现  

Performance-based Equity Incentives,Exercise Conditions and Corporate ESG Performance

作　　者：王欣桐 王雷[2] Wang Xintong;Wang Lei

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院 [2]兰州大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理会计研究》2024年第3期22-35,共14页MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING STUDIES

摘　　要：企业ESG表现颇受投资者关注,提升企业ESG表现以提高竞争力也逐渐形成共识。作为一种长期激励方式,股权激励如何促使高管提升企业ESG表现?为了研究这一问题,本文选取2008—2021年沪深A股上市公司作为研究对象,探究业绩型股权激励及其行权条件对企业ESG表现的影响。实证结果表明,业绩型股权激励显著提升企业ESG表现。当高管任期较长时,这一关系更为显著。进一步研究发现,行权业绩考核越难、行权等待期越长越有助于提升企业ESG表现,但行权有效期不影响企业ESG表现。上述研究结论有助于企业完善高管股权激励的契约结构,促进企业ESG表现的提升。Corporate ESG performance has gained significant attention from investors,with a growing consensus that enhancing corporate ESG performance is crucial for improving competitiveness.As a long-term incentive mechanism,how does equity incentive motivate executives to enhance corporate ESG performance?To address this question,this paper obtains a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share public companies from 2008 to 2021,investigating the impact of performance-based equity incentives and their exercise conditions on corporate ESG performance.Empirical results show that performance-based equity incentives significantly enhance corporate ESG performance,and this relationship is more pronounced when executive tenure is longer.Additionally,this study finds that difficulties in performance assessment and longer waiting period for exercising stock options positively relate to corporate ESG performance.However,the expiration period of stock options does not affect corporate ESG performance.Overall,this study contributes to refining the contractual structure of executive equity incentives,and facilitating the improvement of corporate ESG performance.

关 键 词：业绩型股权激励 行权时间限制 行权业绩考核 企业ESG表现 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]