管理者能力对预算松弛的影响研究  

The Impact of High-ability Managers on Budget Slack

作　　者：刘凌冰[1] 张琳蕊 LIU Lingbing;ZHANG Linrui

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《财务研究》2024年第3期24-37,共14页Finance Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AGL010)。

摘　　要：本文以2007~2021年A股上市公司为研究样本,手工收集上市公司年报等公告中企业自愿披露的预算信息,检验管理者能力对预算松弛的影响。研究发现,管理者能力越强的企业其预算松弛程度越高,这一发现打破了对管理者能力认知的“晕轮效应”。借鉴舞弊三角理论的三维度原理探寻其原因,发现能力强的管理者在声誉维护等方面的压力更大,风险承担水平更低,更倾向于制造预算松弛;能力强的管理者可以制造更强的信息不对称,制造预算松弛的机会更多;环境不确定性给能力强的管理者制造预算松弛提供了借口。在此基础上,检验了相应的解决措施:为管理者提供合理的超额薪酬、加强内部控制和加快数字化转型,可以抑制能力高的管理者制造预算松弛。This paper explores the impact of high-ability managers on budget slack,based on the sample of A-share listed companies in 2007-2021 and the budget information voluntarily disclosed in the annual reports and other announcements by listed companies,which is manually collected.The study finds that firms with high-ability managers had higher budget slack level,which break the halo effect perception of managers'competence.We explore the causes based on the fraud triangle theory and find that the high-ability managers have greater pressure on reputation maintenance,and the level of risk is lower,so they are more inclined to create budget slack.The high-ability managers can create stronger information asymmetry,which leads to more opportunities for them to create budget slack.The environmental uncertainty provides an excuse for the high-ability managers to create higher level of budget slack.On this basis,corresponding solutions were tested:providing reasonable excess compensation for managers,strengthening the quality of internal control and accelerating digital transformation,which can inhibit the high-ability managers create budget slack.

关 键 词：管理者能力 预算松弛 舞弊三角理论 晕轮效应 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]