考虑政府规制下的竞争企业社会责任策略分析  

Analysis of firm’s corporate social responsibility strategies in duopoly competition under government regulations

作　　者：朱晗 李彤 唐加福[1,2] 黄伟祥[3] ZHU Han;LI Tong;TANG Jiafu;HUANG Weixiang(School of Management Science and Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance&Economics,Dalian 116025,China;Key Laboratory of Liaoning Province for Data Analytics and Decision-Making Optimization,Dongbei University of Finance&Economics,Dalian 116025,China;School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,大连116025 [2]东北财经大学辽宁省大数据管理与优化决策重点实验室,大连116025 [3]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510641

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第4期1321-1334,共14页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72322018,72293563,72272027,71902018)。

摘　　要：随着公众对企业社会责任(corporate social responsibility,CSR)关注的提升,企业社会责任策略的选择极大影响着企业的利润与社会福利,企业如何选择经营策略以及政府如何采取规制措施促进企业CSR合规经营显得愈发重要.基于此,本文构建双寡头垄断市场下的博弈模型,研究古诺竞争环境下的企业社会责任策略及政府规制措施.从企业视角刻画企业在不同环境下的最优运营策略,分析企业采取CSR合规经营的动机,探究暴露风险(暴露概率与需求敏感度)和CSR合规成本溢价对企业运营策略的影响.在此基础上从政府管理者视角提出五种可行的规制措施以促进企业的CSR合规经营,并分析每种措施的施行效果与对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响.研究表明,政府出台强制性CSR要求可能帮助企业跳出囚徒困境获得更高利润,但同时会损害消费者剩余与社会福利;量化企业CSR努力水平可以有效避免企业的CSR违规经营,提高消费者剩余与社会福利,形成市场-政府-消费者三赢的局面;避免市场过度竞争,对提升市场整体CSR合规程度有一定促进作用,但会带来其他不利影响;设立补贴在最大化社会福利的基础上,能有效激励企业选择CSR合规经营方式;而设立CSR违规罚金,虽然可以促使企业转向CSR合规经营,但会导致社会整体福利下降.With more attention paid on corporate social responsibility(CSR),firms’CSR operational strategies greatly impact their profits and social welfare.It becomes more and more important for a firm to carefully choose its CSR operational strategy,and how the government takes regulation methods to promote CSR operations is increasingly significant.This work adopts a Cournot model in which two firms engage in duopoly competition,to study firms’CSR strategies from different perspectives.First,from the perspective of firms,this paper studies firms’incentives to adopt CSR compliance strategy,and how exposure risk(exposure probability and demand sensitivity)and cost premium impact firms’operational strategies in a competition context.Then from the perspective of policymakers,this paper proposes five different regulatory methods,and explores the performance of these methods and the impact on consumer surplus and social welfare.The results show that mandatory requirement on firms’CSR strategy may either benefit or hurt firms’profitability.The results show that mandatory requirement on firms’CSR strategy may help firms escape the prisoner’s dilemma;however,it might lower consumer surplus and social welfare.Quantifying firms’;CSR effort level is effective in prohibiting firms’non-CSR behavior.Meanwhile,the method can improve consumer surplus and social welfare,leading to a win-win-win outcome among the market,policymakers and consumers.Weaken competition can promote firms’CSR compliance strategy,but it can result in some negative effects.On the basis of social welfare maximization,subsidy can promote firms to adopt CSR compliance strategy,while charging penalty rates lowers social welfare.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 古诺模型 竞争环境 规制措施 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]