基于风险企业家公平偏好的融资契约控制权配置  

The Allocation of Control Rights in Financing Contracts Based on Venture Entrepreneurs’Fairness Preference

作　　者：白千慧 李云飞[1] BAI Qianhui;LI Yunfei(School of Mathematics&Information,China West Normal University,Nanchong 637009,Sichuan,China)

机构地区：[1]西华师范大学数学与信息学院,四川南充637009

出　　处：《科技和产业》2024年第12期1-7,共7页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72101172);西华师范大学英才科研基金(17YC381)。

摘　　要：风险企业的控制权配置和激励约束构成了其融资契约的关键要素。由于契约的不完备性,将行为经济学中的公平偏好引入融资契约模型,研究在风险企业家具备公平偏好心理时对控制权配置的影响,以及激励约束与公平偏好之间的关系。研究发现,控制权配置比例与风险企业家的自豪强度和嫉妒强度呈正相关,与同情强度呈负相关;风险企业家的最优努力水平是自豪强度和嫉妒强度的增函数,是同情强度的减函数。The allocation of control rights and incentive constraints are integral components of financing contracts for venture enterprises.Recognizing the incompleteness of contracts,the concept of fairness preferences from behavioral economics into the financing contract model was incorporated.The impact of entrepreneurs’fairness preferences on the distribution of control rights was explored and the interplay between incentive constraints and fairness preferences was examined.The results indicate a positive correlation between the proportion of allocated control rights and the entrepreneurs’intensity of pride and envy,coupled with a negative correlation linked to their compassion intensity.Furthermore,optimal effort levels for the entrepreneurs are found to be an increasing function of their pride and envy intensities a decreasing function of compassion intensity.

关 键 词：控制权配置 公平偏好 激励机制 融资契约 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] F83