公司章程反收购条款:长期价值创造的盾牌还是管理层防御的工具  

Anti-takeover Provisions in Articles of Association:Shields for Long-term Value Creation or Tools for Manage-ment Defense

作　　者：袁春生[1] 牛世魁 Yuan Chunsheng;Niu Shikui(School of Accounting,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics and Management,North University of China)

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学会计学院 [2]中北大学经济与管理学院 [3]山西省社会科学院(山西省人民政府发展研究中心) [4]山西大学

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2024年第3期194-203,256,I0035,I0036,共13页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19BGL060);山西省哲学社会科学规划课题(2023YY161);山西省高等学校哲学社会科学研究项目(2023W086)资助。

摘　　要：公司章程反收购条款有助于促进管理者专注于长期价值创造,还是被用于维护职位稳定?学术界和资本市场监管机构对此高度关注。本研究实证检验我国上市公司章程中反收购条款设置对公司治理的影响。研究发现,反收购条款设置不仅没有对公司价值产生提升作用,反而降低了公司价值。进一步研究发现,反收购条款降低了管理层强制变更—业绩的敏感性,抑制了公司创新投资和资本支出等长期投资行为,且诱发了管理层在职消费和超额薪酬,意味着反收购条款有助于巩固管理层职位稳定,加剧了管理层短视,产生了管理层“壕沟”效应。研究结果表明,我国上市公司章程中的反收购条款并非长期价值创造的盾牌,而是管理层防御的工具。此外,深入分析现阶段我国上市公司主要设置的反收购条款的性质和内涵,发现这些条款大多数体现了对管理层的保护,并且管理层权力较高和无实际控制人的上市公司更倾向于设置管理层保护条款。异质性检验结果表明,股权分散企业或无实际控制人企业中,反收购条款设置的管理层“壕沟”效应更加显著。本研究克服了已有文献仅根据反收购条款对公司绩效正向或负向影响而间接推断其效应的不足,为上市公司和监管部门规范反收购条款设置提供参考。In recent years,there has been an increasing number of hostile acquisitions in China’s capital market,leading to heightened competition for control rights.As a result,many listed companies have incorporated anti-takeover provisions into their articles of association to fend off unsolicited takeovers.The impact of anti-takeover provisions on the internal governance of companies,while playing a defensive role in the transfer of control,is a significant concern for the academic community and capital market regulatory authorities.Regarding the economic consequences of anti-takeover provisions,two distinct viewpoints exist.One hypothesis is the“long-term value creation”theory,which posits that anti-takeover provisions can mitigate short-sighted management.Conversely,the“management defense”hypothesis suggests that anti-takeover provisions will amplify conflicts between management and shareholder agents.In the context of China’s capital market practices,in recent years,regulatory authorities have raised concerns regarding the logic behind certain listed companies’addition or revision of anti-takeover provisions to their articles of association.Given the mixed findings of literature research and the practical challenges posed by regulatory requirements,there is an urgent need to thoroughly investigate the governance role of anti-takeover provisions in the management of listed companies in China at this stage.This article utilizes data from Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2009 and 2019 to empirically examine whether anti-takeover provisions in company charters promote long-term value creation or whether they instead serve as a defense for management.The study reveals that the more anti-takeover provisions a company has,the lower its value.These provisions inhibit long-term investments such as R&D and capital expenditures,lower the sensitivity of forced management turnover to performance,and spur self-interested behaviors like perquisite consumption and excessive compensation

关 键 词：公司章程反收购条款 公司价值 管理层防御 长期价值创造 管理层保护条款 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]