基于政府补贴的闭环供应链不同回收模式决策研究  

Research on decision making of different recycling modes in closed-loop supply chain based on government subsidy

作　　者：宿恺[1] 李鹏宇 SU Kai;LI Pengyu(School of Management,Shenyang University of Technology,Shenyang,Liaoning 110870,China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳工业大学管理学院,辽宁沈阳110870

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第3期311-317,共7页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：辽宁省科技厅重点研发项目(2019JH8/10100068)。

摘　　要：探究政府补贴政策对不同混合回收模式中供应链成员利润和整体利润的作用,建立Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析不同回收模式中供应链成员利润和整体利润的变化,并进行数值仿真分析,指出政府补贴额度的增加可提高最优回收模式中各回收主体利润和供应链整体利润,得到闭环供应链最优回收模式,提出提高补贴额度、增强宣传教育、完善补贴机制、打造产业集群等对策建议,为闭环供应链回收模式选择决策提供理论基础和借鉴。The effects of government subsidy policies are explored on the profits of each and overall supply chain members in different mixed recycling modes.The Stackelberg game model is established.The changes in the profits of each members and overall supply chain members are compared and analyzed with different recycling modes.And the numerical simulation analysis is conducted.It is pointed out that increasing the amount of government subsidy can increase the profits of each recycling entity and the overall supply chain profits in the optimal recycling mode,and the optimal recycling model for the closed-loop supply chain is obtained.The countermeasures and suggestions are proposed,such as increasing subsidy amounts,enhancing publicity and education,improving subsidy mechanisms,and building industrial clusters,etc.Theoretical basis and reference are provided for decision-making on the recycling model of the closed-loop supply chain.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 回收模式 STACKELBERG博弈 政府补贴 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]