理性限度内的同情——论康德同情的义务  

Sympathy within the Limits of Reason-On Kant’s Duty of Sympathy

作　　者：惠永照 Hui Yongzhao

机构地区：[1]河南师范大学政治与公共管理学院

出　　处：《德国哲学》2023年第2期38-50,301,302,共15页Chinese Journal of German Philosophy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“康德道德心理学研究”(项目编号:22BZX073)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：在《道德形而上学》中,同情被看作一项基于人性的特殊的、有条件的义务。通过区分“实践的人性”和“感性的人性”,同情的义务被限定在了互相传达情感的能力和意志上,为此就要培养我们同情的自然情感,将我们对他人苦难的反应从一种自然意义上的同情提升为一种道德的同情。康德将同情看作促进实际的和理性的仁慈的手段,这意味着一方面同情的义务是促进“爱的义务”中的“慈善的义务”的手段,另一方面同情的义务也是一个具有自己内容的独立义务,即要我们积极主动地走近他人,理解他人的状态,而不要自我孤立,与他人相隔离;与此同时,要积极地传达情感,而不要对他人的苦难冷漠待之。虽然康德本身有众多“反同情”的发言,然而从根本上说,这些发言旨在强调同情情感中的自主性,因而是在倡导一种理性限度内的同情,而非对他人无动于衷的冷漠。In The Metaphysics of Morals,sympathy is regarded as a special and conditional duty based on humanity.By distinguishing between“humanitas aesthetica”and“humanitas practica”,the duty of sympathy is limited to the ability and will to communicate feelings to each other.Therefore,we should cultivate our natural feelings of sympathy and promote our response to other people’s suffering from a natural sense of sympathy to a moral one.Kant regards sympathy as a means to promote practical and rational benevolence.It means two things:On the one hand,the duty of sympathy is a means to promote“the duty of beneficence”,which is the first duty of love.On the other hand,the duty of sympathy is also an independent duty with its own contents,that is,we should actively approach others and understand their state,instead of being isolated from others;At the same time,we should actively communicate our feelings and not be indifferent to the suffering of others.Although Kant himself has many statements against sympathy,fundamentally speaking,these statements are intended to emphasize the autonomy in the feeling of sympathy, so they are advocating a kind of sympathy within the limits of reason, rather than indifference to oth-ers.

关 键 词：同情 实践的人性 感性的人性 敏感性 不动心 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学] B82-0