基于随机演化博弈视角的绿色农产品生产与合谋监管研究  

Research on the Production and Collusion Supervision of Green Agricultural Products Based on the Perspective of Stochastic Evolutionary Games Theory

作　　者：刘琦铀[1] 林丽婷 张成科[1] LIU Qiyou;LIN Liting;ZHANG Chengke(School of Economics,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510520)

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学经济学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《北方园艺》2024年第11期119-126,共8页Northern Horticulture

基　　金：国家社科规划资助项目(22BGL067)。

摘　　要：考虑政府绿色农产品安全生产监管下,农企与第三方检测机构合谋寻租导致市面上“伪绿色”产品频现等问题。该研究将高斯白噪声作为随机干扰项引入,构建了政府监管部门、农企和第三方检测机构在绿色生产与质量监管中的三方随机演化博弈模型。在此基础上,通过数值仿真分析,探讨了随机扰动因素、政府奖惩等因素对各主体策略选择及演化至稳定状态收敛速度的影响;最后,结合数值仿真结果提出了相关政策和建议,以期对当前绿色食品生产与监管提供参考依据。Considering the government′s supervision of green agricultural product safety production,the collusion between agricultural enterprises and third-party testing institutions in rent seeking has led to the frequent occurrence of‘pseudo green’products on the market.This study introduced Gaussian white noise as a random interference term and constructs a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model for government regulatory departments,agricultural enterprises,and third-party testing institutions in green production and quality supervision.On this basis,numerical simulation analysis was conducted to explore the effects of random disturbance factors,government rewards and punishments,and other factors on the selection of strategies and the convergence rate of evolution to a stable state for each agent.Finally,relevant policies and suggestions were proposed based on the numerical simulation results,in order to provide reference for the current production and regulation of green food.

关 键 词：绿色农产品监管 合谋寻租 随机演化博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]