不对称信息下考虑风险的绿色供应链决策研究  

Green supply chain game models considering risk aversion under information asymmetry

作　　者：蔡建湖 蒋乐 杨梦园 马香媛[2] CAI Jianhu;JIANG Le;YANG Mengyuan;MA Xiangyuan(Experimental Center of Data Science and Intelligent Decision-Making,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Management,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学数据科学与智能决策实验中心,杭州310018 [2]杭州电子科技大学管理学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第5期1615-1632,共18页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：浙江省社科规划专项课题(2023ZXKT027);国家自然科学基金(71972171);国家社会科学基金(22BGL305)。

摘　　要：本文研究了需求信息不对称环境下绿色供应链成员的最优决策,重点关注以下三种情形:制造商和零售商均风险规避,仅零售商风险规避,仅制造商风险规避.讨论了风险规避系数和信息不对称对绿色供应链成员最优决策及其效用的影响,进一步在三种情形下分别引入成本共担契约来优化绿色供应链性能.研究表明:风险规避系数的取值、产品绿色度及零售价格对市场需求影响的相对大小会对最优决策产生一定的影响;三种情形下信息不对称均会降低制造商的效用,但是对零售商效用产生的影响与制造商对市场需求评估值的大小有关;不管信息对称与否,制造商和零售商对三种情形的偏好序列是固定的;在满足一定条件时,三种情形下成本共担契约的引入均可以提高产品的绿色度,并实现绿色供应链性能的帕累托改进.This paper studies the optimal decisions of the green supply chain(GSC)under demand information asymmetry,and mainly focuses the following three situations:Both the manufacturer and the retailer are risk averse,only the retailer is risk averse,and only the manufacturer is risk averse.The impacts of risk-aversion coefficient and information asymmetry on the GSC members’optimal decisions and utilities are discussed.Then,the cost-sharing contracts are introduced to optimize the GSC’s performance under three situations.The results show that:The GSC’s equilibrium solutions are influenced by the value of risk-aversion coefficient,and the joint impact of green degree and retail price on the market demand;under three situations,information asymmetry always reduces the manufacturer’s utility,and it is not necessarily beneficial to the retailer,which is related to the demand information value evaluated by the manufacturer;whether the information is symmetric or not,the preference sequences of the manufacturer and the retailer for three situations are fixed;meanwhile,given specific conditions,the cost-sharing contracts can improve the products’green degree and help the GSCs achieve Pareto improvements under three situations.

关 键 词：绿色供应链 信息不对称 风险规避 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]