替换原则的语用辩护何以不可行  

Why the Pragmatic Defense of the Principle of Substitutivity Cannot Work

作　　者：郭立东 GUO Li-dong(Department of Philosophy,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610041,China)

机构地区：[1]四川大学哲学系,成都610041

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2024年第3期34-40,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

摘　　要：根据朴素指称主义,专名的语义内容是专名的指称,共指专名在语句中相互替换不改变语句的真值。然而,存在着共指专名相互替换的命题态度报告,被普通语言使用者在直觉上认为有不同真值。很多朴素指称主义者试图给出一种语用辩护。即,这样的一对语句蕴涵了不同信息,并且在直觉上被误认为是语句的语义内容。这种解释无法奏效。因为这种被假设存在的蕴涵是与命题态度报告的表达方式相联系的,因而要么是基于方式准则的会话蕴涵,要么是约定蕴涵。如果是前者,找不到所需要的方式准则,如果是后者,它们不会影响普通语言使用者对语句真值的判断。According to naive Referentialism,the semantic content of a proper name is its reference,and co-refer-ential proper names can substitute for each other in a sentence without changing its truth value.However,the prop-ositional attitude reports,in which co-referential proper names substitute for each other,are intuitively thought to have different truth values by ordinary language users.Many naive referentialists try to give a pragmatic defense.That is,such a pair of sentences implicate different information which is intuitively mistaken for the semantic con-tent of the sentences.This defense cannot work.Because the putative implicatures are related to the manner of ex-pression of the propositional attitude reports,they are either conversational implicatures based on a maxim of man-ner or conventional implicatures.In the former case,the required manner maxim cannot be found,whereas in the latter case they are unlikely to affect ordinary language users'judgments of the truth values of the sentences.

关 键 词：专名 替换原则 语用学 会话蕴涵 命题态度 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]