干预主义与随附性  

Interventionism and Supervenience

作　　者：李珍 LI Zhen(School of Marxism,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China)

机构地区：[1]中山大学马克思主义学院,广州510275

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2024年第3期48-54,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“多元物理主义框架下的心理因果性问题研究”(21FZXB064)。

摘　　要：部分学者认为,随附性会对因果关系的干预主义理论产生不可避免的多层次混淆问题,以至于我们必须在干预主义和随附性之间做出选择。针对这个问题,学界目前有四种解决方案:可固定性条件的豁免方案、因果图方案、应用范围的限定方案和合比例性约束方案,其中,合比例性约束方案最为合理,其他方案都需要付出一定的理论成本。随附性是一种“表面”关系,不论在哲学还是科学上,它与因果关系都是难以区分的,因此,随附关系应与因果关系一样被视为可能的混杂因素,干预的可固定性条件无需豁免,混淆问题并不是一个真问题。It has been argued that supervenience generates unavoidable multi-level confounding problems for inter-ventionist accounts of causation,so we must choose between interventionism and supervenience.There are four ap-proaches to solve the problem:exemption of fixation,the approach of causal graph,limited application scope schemes,and the proportionality constraint.Among them,the proportionality constraint is the most reasonable,while others undermine the methodological validity of causal tests.Supervenience is a"surface"relationship,which is difficult to distinguish from causation in philosophy and science.Therefore,Supervenience should be re-garded as a possible hybrid variable like causation.Confounding problems is not a real problem.

关 键 词：干预主义 随附性 因果关系 可固定性 多层次 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]