考虑集中式惩罚和参照依赖的企业环保投资行为与合作演化  

Corporate Environmental Investment Behavior and Cooperation Evolution Considering Centralized Sanction and Reference Dependence

作　　者：廖玉玲 雷思颖 宋美喆[2] 曾理宁 邓雯康 胡道夫 Liao Yuling;Lei Siyin;Song Meizhe;Zeng Lining;Deng Wenkang;Hu Daofu(School of Business Administration,Hunan University of Finance and Economics,Changsha 410205,China;School of Finance,Hunan University of Finance and Economics,Changsha 410205,China;School of Business,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410006,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南财政经济学院工商管理学院,湖南长沙410205 [2]湖南财政经济学院财政经济学院,湖南长沙410205 [3]湖南师范大学商学院,湖南长沙410006

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第5期307-314,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(17CGL056);湖南省自然科学基金面上项目(2023JJ30105);湖南省教育厅科学研究项目(23A0671);湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会项目(XSP22YBZ181)。

摘　　要：基于集中式惩罚和参照依赖相结合的视角,构建企业环保投资合作的演化博弈模型,利用计算仿真实验再现了企业参与环保投资合作的演化博弈过程。研究结果表明:一是在适当的惩罚力度下,集中式惩罚机制可以提高企业环保投资合作水平;二是不同惩罚力度下企业环保投资合作中的集体行动收益具有显著差异,在特定条件下对企业的惩罚力度存在一个最优阈值,可使集体行动收益达到最大化;三是仅考虑惩罚激励因素,不足以维持企业环保投资合作,更重要的是形成企业间参照依赖下的良性策略互动,才能充分激励企业积极参与环保投资合作行动。以上结论为企业环保投资合作提供了新思路,有助于推动我国生态环境改善。As important participants of society,enterprises should take responsibility of investing in the public environment production.However,the enterprises may be non-cooperative during the investment due to the public attributes of environmental resources and the externality characteristics of environmental investment,which may lead to the undercapitalization,and thus the cooperation would get to the collective action dilemma.Based on the perspective of combining centralized punishment and reference dependence,an evolutionary game model of enterprise environmental investment cooperation is constructed,and different application scenarios of cooperation invest are simulated that with/without the influence factors of reference dependence strategy interac⁃tion rules,centralized punishment mechanism,different penalties,etc.Then,by the statistical testing methods,the impact of centralized punishment and enterprise reference dependence strategy interaction on enterprise environmental investment cooperation is analyzed under different penalties.It is found that(1)With appropriate penalties,the centralized punishment mechanism can improve the level of enterprise environmental investment cooperation;(2)Under different penalties,there is a significant difference in the benefits of collec⁃tive action in enterprise environmental investment cooperation.Under certain conditions,there is an optimal threshold for the penalty of enterprises,which can maximize the benefits of collective action;(3)When considering the incentive factors of punishment only,it is not enough to maintain enterprise environmental investment cooperation.More importantly,the formation of a benign strategic interaction based on reference dependence between enterprises can fully stimulate enterprises to actively participate in environmental invest⁃ment cooperation actions.The above conclusions provide new ideas for improving the ecological environment.

关 键 词：企业环保投资 集体行动 集中式惩罚 参照依赖 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]