检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:于晓辉 李武 李汉章 Xiaohui YU;Wu LI;Hanzhang LI(School of Logistics&Institute for Carbon Peak and Neutrality,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China;Odette School of Business,University of Windsor,Windsor,Ontario N9B 3B4,Canada;School of Logistics,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China)
机构地区:[1]北京物资学院物流学院与双碳研究院,北京101149 [2]温莎大学奥德特商学院,加拿大安大略N9B 3B4 [3]北京物资学院物流学院,北京101149
出 处:《运筹学学报(中英文)》2024年第2期58-70,共13页Operations Research Transactions
基 金:国家自然科学基金(Nos.72171024,71801016,72074002)。
摘 要:联盟结构合作对策一般涉及两个层次合作:局中人先组成小联盟,然后再以小联盟整体参与大联盟的合作。由于一带一路倡议中小联盟群体参与合作项目往往话语权有限,容易处于收益分配的劣势,从而影响参与合作项目的积极性,因而有必要对联盟结构合作对策及其求解方法做进一步的研究。基于此,我们首先构造一种能够考虑小联盟规模对合作影响的新求解方法——加权Owen值。然后,基于联盟结构合作对策与加权Owen值刻画一带一路倡议下的多层次、复杂交叉的合作关系,获得各个单位参与跨境合作项目可能的收益分配范围及性质。最后,通过算例演示了联盟结构合作对策分配策略的计算方法。因此,基于加权Owen值计算各个单位参与跨境合作项目可能的收益分配范围,为跨境合作的大项目提供一定的决策依据。The cooperative game with coalition structure generally involves two levels of cooperation:in which the players first form a small coalition,and then participate in the cooperation of the big coalition as a whole.In the One Belt,One Road Initiative,small sized alliance groups often have a weak voice in participating in cooperation projects,so they are easily at the disadvantages of profit distribution and their cooperative enthusiasm are affected.Therefore,it is necessary to further study the cooperative game with coalition structure and its solution.Based on this,a new solution method(i.e.,weighted Owen value)is proposed in this paper,which can consider the impact of small coalition size on the cooperation.Then,based on the cooperative game with coalition structure and weighted Owen value,we describe the multi-level and complex cooperation relationship in the One Belt,One Road Initiative.The possible range of profit distribution are gotten for the player in the cross-border cooperation projects.Thus,the proposed weighted Owen value can be used to get a possible profit distribution range for each participant in cross border cooperation projects,which may provide a theoretical decision basis for the cross border largescale projects.
分 类 号:O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] N945.25[理学—数学]
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.49