单一经济实体规则的经营者集中执法实践:中国国企如何面对欧盟的挑战  

Merge Control Practicesunder Single Economic Entity Rule:How Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Face the Challenges of the European Union

作　　者：刘思洁 姚舜禹 Liu Sijie;Yao Shunyu

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学数据法治研究院 [2]北京大成律师事务所

出　　处：《竞争政策研究》2024年第3期61-69,共9页Competition Policy Research

摘　　要：面对中国国家资本的持续涌入,欧盟采取了既欢迎又审慎的态度。欧盟委员会适用单一经济实体规则的过程存在一定程度的倾向性,而中国国有企业的抗辩理由通常无法阻止欧盟委员会采取“最坏情形假设”,由此面临赴欧投资的最严峻挑战。有必要对单一经济实体规则的问题进行探源,在学理和法理层面对国资委与国有企业之间的独立决策问题进行研究和解释,以期在现有欧盟体制下提出更加具有说服力的抗辩理由和应对策略,更好维护我国国企域外投资的生存空间和合法权益。Confronting the continuous influx of Chinese state-owned capital,the Europe has adopted a complex attitude mixing welcoming and prudent.There is a certain degree of discrimination in the application of the single economic entity rule by the European Commission,and the defenses of Chinese state-owned enterprises usually cannot stop the“worstcase scenario”adopted by the European Commission,thus facing the most severe challenge to investing in Europe.Exploring the sources of the single economic entity rule,researching and explaining the relationship of independent power of decision between the SASAC and SOEs at the academic and practical levels,put forward more convincing defenses and countermeasures under the existing EU regime are the basic strategies conducive to safeguarding the living space and legitimate interests of Chinese SOEs investing overseas.

关 键 词：单一经济实体 欧盟竞争法 国有资产监督管理委员会 国有企业 独立决策权 

分 类 号：D996[政治法律—经济法学] D922.294[政治法律—国际法学] F279.2[政治法律—法学] F125[经济管理—企业管理] F15[经济管理—国民经济]