高管研发背景对短视行为的影响  

The Impact of Executive R&D Background on Myopia Behavior

作　　者：叶淑君 蔡三希 YE Shujun;CAI Sanxi(Business School,Guangdong University of Commerce and Technology,Zhaoqing,Guangdong 526020;School of Economics and Management,Zhaoqing University,Zhaoqing,Guangdong 526061,China)

机构地区：[1]广东工商职业技术大学商学院,广东肇庆526020 [2]肇庆学院经济与管理学院,广东肇庆526061

出　　处：《肇庆学院学报》2024年第4期43-50,62,共9页Journal of Zhaoqing University

基　　金：2024年度肇庆市哲学社会科学规划项目(24GJ-43)。

摘　　要：基于高阶理论和烙印理论,以2013—2022年中国A股上市公司为样本,本研究考察了高管研发背景对短视行为的影响。研究发现高管研发背景与短视行为呈显著负相关关系,表明高管研发背景能抑制短视行为;分析师关注削弱了高管研发背景对短视行为的负向影响,表明了分析师关注能发挥调节作用。经稳健性检验后结论保持不变。异质性分析发现,高管研发背景与短视行为的负向关系在非国有企业和高科技行业中更为明显。Based on the higher order theory and branding theory,this study examines the impact of executive R&D background on myopia behavior,using China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022 as a sample.The study finds that executive R&D background is significantly negatively correlated with myopia behavior,indicating that executive R&D background can inhibit myopia behavior.Analyst attention weakens the negative impact of executive R&D background on myopia behavior,indicating that analyst attention can play a substitution effect.The conclusion remains unchanged after robustness test.Heterogeneity analysis finds that the negative relationship between executive R&D background and myopia behavior is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech industries.

关 键 词：研发背景 短视行为 分析师关注 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]