基于三方讨价还价的PPP项目控制权双层分配博弈研究  

A Study of a Two-tier Game for the Allocation of Control of PPP Projects Based on Three-party Bargaining

作　　者：张云华 孙娅 谢洪涛 Zhang Yunhua;Sun Ya;Xie Hongtao

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学建筑工程学院 [2]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院

出　　处：《工程经济》2024年第3期21-28,共8页ENGINEERING ECONOMY

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72162026,71942006);教育部人文社科研究基金青年项目(19YJCZH260);云南省基础研究计划面上项目(202101AT070088);云南省“兴滇英才支持计划”青年人才项目(KKRD202206101);昆明理工大学社会科学重点培育项目(KKZ32020064021)。

摘　　要：PPP项目控制权分配是政府和社会资本合作模式中重要的激励机制,对公私合作模式顺利实施至关重要。通过构建控制权在政府部门与联合体之间初始分配、联合体内部再分配的双层动态博弈模型,以实现控制权在PPP项目参与者之间分配的双层优化,最终确定控制权在政府部门、纯投资者和专业公司之间最优的分配比例。研究结果表明:PPP项目参与各方的控制权分配比例与自身谈判能力呈正相关,与对方的谈判能力呈负相关;进而参与各方应充分展示自身优势,增强谈判能力。研究结果对我国公共基础设施PPP项目实践具有理论指导和决策支撑意义。The allocation of control rights in PPP projects is an important incentive mechanism in the government and social capital cooperation model,which is crucial to the smooth implementation of the public-private partnership model.By constructing a two-tier dynamic game model with the initial allocation of control rights between government departments and the consortium and the reallocation within the consortium,in order to achieve a two-tier optimization of the allocation of control rights among PPP project participants,the optimal allocation ratio of control rights among government departments,pure investors and professional companies is finally determined.The research results show that the proportion of control rights allocated to each party involved in a PPP project is positively correlated with its own bargaining power and negatively correlated with the bargaining power of the other party;in turn,each party involved should fully demonstrate its own advantages and enhance its bargaining power.The research results have theoretical guidance and decision-making support implications for the practice of public infrastructure PPP projects in China.

关 键 词：PPP项目 讨价还价博弈 控制权分配 谈判能力 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]