论政治现实主义者对G.A.科恩事实与原则关系论述的批评  

On Political Realists'Criticism of G.A.Cohen's Account of the Relationship between Facts and Principles

作　　者：杨昊 YANG Hao(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《内蒙古大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第3期107-112,共6页Journal of Inner Mongolia University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：政治哲学中规范原则与政治事实之间关系的争论是一个重要的政治哲学方法论争论。围绕这一问题,G.A.科恩和政治现实主义者持有相互对立的立场。科恩认为,终极规范原则应当是钝于事实的,而政治现实主义者则认为,规范原则应当是高度敏于事实的。政治现实主义者对科恩立场的批评主要包括三类:对终极规范原则的实践有效性的批评,对科恩终极规范原则和管理规则区分的批评,对科恩认为政治哲学不应当指导实践这一观点的批评。科恩的困难主要源自其论证上的缺陷及其对政治哲学目标的看法,但科恩提出的问题并未得到政治现实主义者很好的回答。调和的立场可能是目前所能看到的最可信的立场。The debate on the relationship between normative principles and political facts in political philosophy is an important methodological debate in political philosophy.Cohen argues that the ultimate normative principle should be fact-insensitive,while contemporary political realists hold the opposing viewpoint that the normative principle should be highly fact-sensitive.Political realists'criticisms towards Cohen's position fall into three main categories,which includes criticism of the practical validity of the ultimate normative principle,criticism of the distinction between Cohen's ultimate normative principle and principles of regulation,and the criticism that political philosophy should not be act-guiding.Cohen's difficulties mainly stem from the defects in his argumentation and his views on the goals of political philosophy,but the question which was put forward by Cohen is not well answered by political realists.A conciliatory position is probably the most plausible one to be found.

关 键 词：政治现实主义 G.A.科恩 事实与原则 

分 类 号：D0[政治法律—政治学] B82-051[哲学宗教—伦理学]