论阿玛蒂亚·森可行能力视域下的人权理念  

On the Concept of Human Rights from the Perspective of Amartya Sen's Capability

作　　者：陈永 郭佳宏[1] CHEN Yong;GUO Jiahong(Center for Studies of Values and Culture,School of Philosophy,Collaborative Innovation Center for Core Socialist Values,Beijing Normal University)

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学价值与文化研究中心、哲学学院、社会主义核心价值观协同创新中心

出　　处：《当代中国价值观研究》2024年第3期122-128,共7页Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“大数据背景下人工智能及其逻辑的哲学反思”(19ZDA031)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：阿玛蒂亚·森为回应功利主义的效用平等和罗尔斯主义的基本善平等提出了可行能力平等,认为可行能力强调基于获取重要功能性活动的实质性自由,凸显了发展和倡导人权的重要性,能够很好地解决和处理人权的一致性、共同性和合法性问题。在其可行能力人权观基础上,努斯鲍姆、罗宾斯、安德森等一批支持可行能力哲学思想的学者试图不断发展和拓展可行能力的可及性,他们更加关注从社会实践层面推进具体的人权。阿玛蒂亚·森的可行能力人权观对于发展民主与法治,推进人权保障工作具有一定的借鉴意义。In response to the utility equality of utilitarianism and the basic good equality of Rawlism,Amartya Sen proposed the equality of capabilities,which emphasize the substantive liberty based on the acquisition of important functionings,highlights the importance of developing and advocating human rights,and can well solve and deal with the problems of the consistency,commonness and legitimacy of human rights.On the basis of Sen's concept of capabilities,a group of scholars such as Nussbaum,Robeyns,Anderson,and others who advocate for the philosophy of capabilities,attempt to continuously develop and expand the accessibility of capabilities,focusing on promoting specific human rights from the perspective of social practice.The last part explores the value and significance of human rights in the development of democracy and law,as well as beyond the law approach,by following Sen's philosophy.

关 键 词：可行能力 人权 功能性活动 自由 

分 类 号：D082[政治法律—政治学]