出 处:《财经研究》2024年第3期138-153,共16页Journal of Finance and Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目“IPO监管审核决策:考量因素披露模式变迁、漏判风险与优化途径”(71872003);国家自然科学基金面上项目“竞争政策与微观企业行为——基于《反垄断法》实施的准自然实验”(71972194);国家社会科学基金重大项目“新时代中国特色管制会计制度体系与智能化实践研究”(21&ZD145)。
摘 要:我国最高人民法院于2022年1月发布《关于审理证券市场虚假陈述侵权民事赔偿案件的若干规定》(简称《规定》),取消了审理上市公司虚假陈述民事案件的行政前置程序。该事件具有两方面的理论检验价值:第一,前置程序取消可能增强市场主体识别潜在诉讼对象的动机,通过考察尚未受到任何行政处罚的潜在虚假陈述公司是否遭受了股票市场负面反应,可以检验前置条件的设置对民事诉讼震慑范围的影响,从而深化对公共执法与私人执法相互关系的理解;第二,给定新《证券法》已做出的一系列变革,可以检验前置程序取消这一单项司法变革相较于已有立法是否具有明显的增量效应。文章研究发现,未受到行政处罚、但虚假陈述倾向较高的公司在《规定》发布日附近发生了显著的股价负面反应,且在交易所异常业绩问询频率较高的公司中更加突出,而已满足行政前置条件的公司在《规定》发布日附近未发生显著的股价反应。文章研究表明,虚假陈述民事诉讼的前置程序取消显著扩大了民事诉讼的震慑范围,对于加强投资者保护、优化营商环境、培育高质量市场主体具有积极意义。In January 2022,the Supreme People’s Court of China abolished the administrative procedural prerequisite for hearing civil cases of falsified statements by listed companies(hereafter,the Regulation).Compared to the judicial interpretation in 2003,the Regulation allows investors to bypass administrative procedures and directly file civil lawsuits against companies suspected of falsified statements.The event has research value in two ways:First,the cancelation of the procedural prerequisite potentially enhances market participants’incentives to identify potential litigation targets.By examining the stock market reaction,the impact of the procedural prerequisite on the scope of civil litigation deterrence can be tested.Second,given the changes already made by the revised Securities Law in 2020,it is possible to evaluate whether this singular judicial reform,i.e.,the Regulation,has a significant incremental effect compared to the existing legislation.This paper first constructs a Logit model of falsified statements,and then identifies companies that have high potential for falsified statements but have not previously been penalized administratively as the treatment group.The results show that,compared to the control group with low propensities for falsified statements and no administrative penalties,the treatment group suffers a significant negative market reaction near the announcement date of the Regulation.However,the market reaction of placebo companies that have been administratively penalized within the past three years does not significantly differ from that of the control group.The placebo test reveals that the treatment group identified in the main test does not undergo a significant stock market reaction in the window near the implementation date of the revised Securities Law.This paper also conducts additional analyses:(1)It tests our underlying assumption that the willingness of investors to file a lawsuit is enhanced.(2)It tests the mechanism behind the market reaction.(3)It excludes alternative expl
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