分税制改革视域下的地方政府债务治理:理论辨析与路径展望  

Local Government Debt Governance from the Perspective of Tax Sharing Reform:Theoretical Analysis and Path Outlook

作　　者：郭玉清[1] GUO Yuqing(School of Economics,Nankai University)

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,300071

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2024年第5期69-80,共12页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71973069)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文通过回顾分税制改革的历史沿革、制度特征和学术争鸣,试图厘清分税制改革对地方政府债务治理的影响机制和改革路径。本文认为,分税制改革有效发挥了中央和地方“两个积极性”,初步构建起同社会主义市场经济体制相适应的分权治理框架。从影响效果来看,分税制改革引领的“双重激励”将地方政府行政动员能力和市场增进能力有效结合起来,激励地方政府举债筹资建设了大量市政基础设施;但侧重“事上”而非“安下”的责任约束机制也导致地方政府债务风险不断衍生泛化、变相积聚。本文为推进高质量发展背景下的分税制改革和地方政府债务治理、构建高水平社会主义市场经济体制提供了财权划分、事权配置、行政监察、市场约束等改革战略取向。This paper examines the historical evolution,institutional characteristics,and academic debates surrounding the tax-sharing system reform,aiming to clarify the reform's institutional effects on local government debt governance and to outline potential pathways for further reform.Amidst the pursuit of high-quality development,it is imperative to advance local government debt governance.It not only concerns the strategic outlook of preventing and resolving major economic and financial risks,it also underscores its theoretical value.There are practical significances in nurturing financial resources and fostering new development impetus.Furthermore,it plays a significant role in constructing a high-level socialist market economy system.It posits that the tax-sharing system reform effectively leverages the“dual incentives”of central and local governments,thereby laying the groundwork for a decentralized governance framework aligned with the socialist market economy.From an institutional economics perspective,the reform of the tax-sharing system primarily influences the policy direction of local government debt governance through fiscal and political incentives.This paper aims to address three key academic debates.Firstly,it argues that the financing patterns of local government debt prior to the tax-sharing system reform do not diminish the institutional impacts brought about by the reform.Secondly,it suggests that vertical transfer payments not only fail to mitigate the fiscal incentives of the tax-sharing system reform but also exacerbate the“common pool”effect on local government debt governance.Thirdly,following the implementation of the tax-sharing system reform,there has been a notable shift in the motivational dynamics driving local officials towards debt financing,transitioning from“a profit-driven orientation”to“one predominantly focused on risk mitigation and avoidance strategies”.Furthermore,this paper analyzes the implications of the tax-sharing system reform,finding that it effectively har

关 键 词：分税制改革 地方政府债务治理 财政激励 政治激励 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学]