信息不对称下新产品研发的合同设计  

The Contract Design of New Product R&D Under Information Asymmetry

作　　者：陈丹梅 李仲飞 陈树敏[3] CHEN Danmei;LI Zhongfei;CHEN Shumin(College of Sciences,Shanghai Institute of Technology,Shanghai 201418;College of Business,Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen 518055;School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520)

机构地区：[1]上海应用技术大学理学院,上海201418 [2]南方科技大学商学院,深圳518055 [3]广东工业大学管理学院,广州510520

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2024年第6期1675-1688,共14页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目(71721001);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171056,71671047);广东省自然科学基金(2020A1515010416)资助课题。

摘　　要：假设企业研发一种新产品,其研发成功的时间具有不确定性.文章运用实物期权方法和委托代理理论,分析信息不对称下新产品研发的合同设计问题,得到了最优合同的显式解.在此基础上,文章进一步分析了信息不对称对委托人价值、新产品研发的退出时机的影响.研究结果表明,信息不对称减少了委托人的价值,使得高成本的新产品的研发退出时机提前;新产品研发成功的平均时间越短,委托人的价值越大.Assume that the enterprise initiates a project to develop a new product,and that the R&D cycle is uncertain.Under information asymmetry,the real option method and principal-agent theory are used to develop the optimal contract for this project.The optimal contract is obtained in closed form.On this basis,the effect of information asymmetry on the principal's value and the optimal exit timing of R&D are also analyzed.Our results show that,with information asymmetry,the principal's value decreases and the exit timing of high-cost R&D is advanced.The shorter the R&D cycle,the greater the value of the principal.

关 键 词：信息不对称 实物期权 委托代理 最优择时 

分 类 号：F273.2[经济管理—企业管理]