考虑银企博弈的供应商应收账款融资决策研究  

Research on Factoring Financing Decision of Supplier’s Accounts Receivable Considering Bank-Enterprise Game

作　　者：李俊豪 陈克红 董克 LI Junhao;CHEN Kehong;DONG Ke(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China;International Institute of Finance,Anhui Province Key Laboratory of Contemporary Logistics and Supply Chain,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China;College of Economics and Management,Bengbu University,Bengbu 233030,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026 [2]中国科学技术大学现代物流与供应链安徽省重点实验室/国际金融研究院,安徽合肥230026 [3]蚌埠学院经济与管理学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第5期98-104,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72101245,72091210/72091215);中国科学技术大学新文科基金一般项目(FSSF-A-230106);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(WK2040000036);安徽省高校自然科学基金项目(KJ2019A0967)。

摘　　要：上游供应商往往会面临因货款被占用而导致的资金短缺现象,这影响了供应链的稳定发展。通过构建银行-供应商-零售商的三层斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型,本文研究当供应商利用应收账款保理融资时,银行、供应商和零售商的均衡决策,以及对实现各方自期望收益最大化的影响。研究表明受需求不确定性影响,零售商和供应商都会面临破产风险,但是供应商破产风险低于零售商的破产风险。另外,供应商的实际产量和银行的期望产量并不总是一致,两者关系受供应商初始资金的影响。最后,银行可以通过调整利率或质押率来约束供应商的产量决策,从而实现银行的利益最大化。In contemporary business environments,the phenomenon of cash flow shortages among upstream suppliers due to accounts receivable tie-up is prevalent,particularly in scenarios involving e-commerce giants such as Alibaba and JD.com.This liquidity constraint not only affects the production and operational efficiency of suppliers but also poses stock-out risks for retailers,thereby impacting the stability and development of the entire supply chain.The exacerbation of this issue is attributed to the fact that the assets of most small and medium-sized enterprises are tied up in accounts receivable,limiting their ability to leverage these assets for financing.The motivation of this study is to explore accounts receivable factoring financing as a strategic decision to alleviate supplier funding pressures,considering dynamic the demand uncertainty and bankruptcy risks within the framework of a bank-enterprise game.The core issue addressed in this research is how suppliers optimize their financing decisions through accounts receivable factoring in the supply chain environment where interactions with retailers and banks occur.Specifically,the study investigates the equilibrium decisions of banks,suppliers,and retailers in a three-party Stackelberg game,focusing on the impact of factoring financing on the expected benefits and bankruptcy risks for all parties involved.The research also examines the relationship between the actual production quantity by suppliers and the expected production quantity by banks,and how this relationship is influenced by the initial capital of suppliers.The significance of this study lies in its theoretical contributions to the field of supply chain finance,particularly in the domain of accounts receivable factoring.By constructing a comprehensive model that considers strategic interactions among banks,suppliers,and retailers,the research provides insights into optimal financing strategies that maximize expected returns while managing risks.Practical implications are equally important,as the findi

关 键 词：供应链融资 应收账款 保理 三方博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]