基于解雇威胁的股东与经理人非合作微分博弈模型研究  

Differential Game Models of Non-cooperation of Shareholders and Managers Based on Dismissal Threat

作　　者：王开弘[1] 王子悦 丁川[1] WANG Kaihong;WANG Ziyue;DING Chuan(School of Mathematics,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学数学学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第5期218-225,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671142,71701164);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(JBK2207065)。

摘　　要：本文针对存在解雇威胁时公司股东与项目经理人之间的非合作问题,构建了两阶段连续时间下双方进行非合作博弈的微分对策模型。通过求解HJB方程得到了该博弈的均衡结果,运用“逆向归纳法”推导出经理人最优投资决策的表达形式,最后从理论推导和数值模拟两个方面分析了“解雇机制”对于经理人最优投资决策和最优努力的影响。研究表明:(1)当企业实物资本所占比例超过某一阈值时,初始资本的增加以及解雇概率的降低会提高经理人的投资积极性;当该比例低于阈值时,初始资本的增加会对经理人最优投资比例的选择产生负向影响,但随着解雇风险的上升,经理人会提高投资比例。(2)经理人所选择的再投资比例,会随着一定范围内企业实物资本所占比重的增加而逐渐降低。(3)解雇机制在参数设置满足约束条件的企业中能够有效激励经理人努力工作。Information asymmetry,which leads to managers to manipulate corporate performance,adopt risky investment strategies,and focus too much on short-term interests,has been a major concern in academia.It also has an impact on the incentive compatibility of the contracts between shareholders and managers of a firm.In order to mitigate the agency conflicts,shareholders will design a series of mechanisms to motivate managers to choose a more suitable strategy for the development of the enterprise.The dismissal of the CEO for his poor performance is an important measure taken by the board.Since it not only results in the loss of dedicated human capital invested in the previous period,but also affects the managers’perks,professional reputations,and even future employments,managers have strong incentives to avoid dismissal.Several scholars have examined performance and non-performance factors affecting the dismissal of managers,indirectly suggesting that executive turnover has become a common phenomenon.However,because it is important to maintain policy continuity and consistency in corporate management,and the arrival of the successor may indicate changes in corporate future decisions:either correcting past mistakes or introducing policies reflecting the different views of the new manager.This releases different signals to investors and affects the market environment.Moreover,when managers anticipate their imminent dismissal,they are more likely to have“short-sighted biases”and place more emphases on short-term performances at the expense of projects that create long-term value for the firm,resulting in higher agency costs.Therefore,combined with the firm’s actual situation,analyzing the impact of executive dismissal on other decisions and corporate future development is significant in evaluating its effectiveness.Based on the current research results,this paper describes the firm’s capital accumulation process from different perspectives,and introduces the dismissal mechanism on the basis of shareholders hiring

关 键 词：非合作博弈 解雇机制 最优投资 HJB方程 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]