诉讼威慑与公司治理优化——基于康美药业集体诉讼的事件研究证据  

Litigation Deterrence and Optimization of Corporate Governance—An Event Study on Class Action Lawsuit Against Kangmei Pharmaceutical

作　　者：李春涛 闫续文[2] 宋敏 LI Chuntao;YAN Xuwen;SONG Min(International Business School,Henan University,Kaifeng,Henan 475001,China;School of Finance,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan,Hubei 430073,China;Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]河南大学国际商学院,河南开封475001 [2]中南财经政法大学金融学院,湖北武汉430073 [3]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第4期129-142,共14页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“新形势下全球创新网络演化及风险治理研究”(20&ZD072);国家自然科学基金项目“多维利益相关者框架下金融市场的食品安全治理机制研究:内部治理、市场约束和债权人监督”(72372161);国家自然科学基金项目“经理人诚信测度及其对企业创新的多维影响研究:融资成本、治理行为与声誉机制”(72072051)。

摘　　要：股东的权利,从享有公司收益、参与重大决策,到提起诉讼要求损害赔偿,被广泛认为是一个经济体中有效配置资本的重要影响因素。康美药业案作为中国第一起实质性集体诉讼,其判决结果深刻影响了资本市场主体的行为。采用事件研究法,以2018—2022年中国A股上市公司为样本,检验了2021年11月12日康美药业证券虚假陈述集体诉讼案一审判决所带来的强化股东保护的公司治理效应。结果发现,盈余管理程度高、被交易所问询多以及存在关联交易的企业,在康美药业案一审判决前后的市场反应更差。此外,相较于其他重要事件日,一审判决对潜在违规企业的威慑更为明显,且威慑效应具有持续性,公司更倾向于守法经营,带来公司治理的优化。为保障中小股东的合法权益,建议政府进一步降低集体诉讼门槛和维权成本,为投资者提供便捷有效的诉讼维权渠道;上市公司增强财务信息质量和透明度,守法经营,依法披露,提升内部治理水平。The rights of shareholders,encompassing the entitlement to company profits,involvement in significant decision-making processes,as well as initiating legal suits for managerial misconduct,are widely acknowledged as a pivotal determinant in effectively allocating capital within an economic entity.The Kangmei Pharmaceutical case,being the first substantive class action lawsuit case in China,exerts a profound influence on the conduct of participants within the capital market.Employing the event study method and taking China s A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2022 as samples,this study investigates the impact of the first-instance judgment of the class action lawsuit against Kangmei Pharmaceutical on November 12,2021,on corporate governance.The findings show that firms with higher levels of earnings management,more related party transactions as well as more inquiry letters from stock exchanges,are correlated with less positive abnormal returns upon the judgment.Furthermore,in comparison to other significant events,the first-instance judgment possesses a more pronounced deterrent effect on potential non-compliant firms,and this effect is sustained over time.Consequently,firms exhibit a greater inclination towards legal compliance,thereby optimizing corporate governance.To safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders,it is recommended that the government further lowers the threshold for class actions and reduces costs in safeguarding the rights and interests of investors,thereby providing them with convenient and effective channels for lawsuits and rights and interests protection.Additionally,listed companies should enhance the quality and transparency of their financial information,operate in compliance with legal regulations,disclose information in accordance with statutory requirements,and elevate their internal governance standards.

关 键 词：康美药业 盈余管理 问询函 关联交易 事件研究 集体诉讼 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学] F271[政治法律—法学] F842.6[经济管理—企业管理] F406.7[经济管理—国民经济]