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作 者:王壮 Zhuang Wang(School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi Jiangsu)
机构地区:[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡
出 处:《运筹与模糊学》2024年第3期490-509,共20页Operations Research and Fuzziology
摘 要:产业技术创新是提高产业创新能力和核心竞争力的重要手段和途径,而产业技术创新联盟是实现产学研深度融合和产业技术创新的一种新型组织形态。然而由于目标和诉求的不同,创新主体往往并不以联盟整体利益最大化为目标投入相应的努力程度和合作程度,这直接影响到联盟的协同创新效率与稳定运行。为合理协调联盟成员间的利益关系,亟需建立一种有效的利益分配机制。基于此,针对产业技术创新联盟的利益分配问题,利用博弈论和优化模型,构建了产业技术创新联盟利益模型,分析了合作和非合作下的最优决策,考虑到风险承担和知识贡献是影响利益分配的重要因素,设计了联盟利益分配机制,并以案例验证了模型的可行性和有效性。The industrial technology innovation is an important means and way to improve industrial inno-vation capacity and core competitiveness,while its alliance is a new organizational form to realize the deep integration of industry-university-research and industrial technology innovation.However,due to the different goals and demands,innovation subjects often do not put in the corresponding degree of effort and cooperation with the goal of maximizing the overall benefits of the alliance,which directly affects the efficiency and stable operation of collaborative innovation of the alliance.In order to reasonably coordinate the interest relationship among alliance members,an effective benefit allocation mechanism is urgently needed.In view of this,we address the benefit distribu-tion problem of industrial technology innovation alliance,construct a benefit model of industrial technology innovation alliance using game theory and optimization model,analyze the optimal decision under cooperation and non-cooperation,design the benefit distribution mechanism of al-liance considering risk taking and knowledge contribution as important factors affecting benefit distribution,and verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model with cases.
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