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作 者:吴昊[1] 谭德庆[1] WU Hao;TAN Deqing(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)
机构地区:[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031
出 处:《信息系统学报》2024年第2期139-164,共26页China Journal of Information Systems
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571149);成都市软科学研究项目(2020RK00-00179-ZF)。
摘 要:本文在不同首播权情形下,通过构建劣势运营商与优势运营商微分博弈模型,分析了劣势运营商的节目最优播出模式和宣传策略。研究表明:劣势运营商应根据用户对节目收费定价的敏感度决策最优播出模式;进一步得到了劣势运营商节目推出前后的最优宣传时间和宣传投入;劣势运营商在未取得首播权情形下,节目推出前的宣传时间应随着溢出效应的增加而缩短,且节目推出前的宣传时间应比取得首播权情形下节目推出前的宣传时间要短。This paper analyses the optimal broadcasting mode and promotion strategy of program of inferior operator by constructing differential game model between inferior operator and superior operator under different premiere right situations.The study shows that the inferior operator should decide the optimal broadcasting mode according to the sensitivity of users to the pricing of program fees.Further,the optimal promotion time and the optimal proportion of promotion investment before and after the launch of the program of the inferior operator are obtained.In the case of the inferior operator without the premier rights,the promotion time before the launch of its program should be shorter as the spillover effect increases,and the promotion time before the launch of the program of the inferior operator without the premier rights should be shorter than that of the program of the inferior operator with the premier rights.
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