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作 者:李懿行 李政 郭建学 Li Yixing;Li Zheng;Guo Jianxue
机构地区:[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071 [2]南开大学金融发展研究院,天津300071
出 处:《证券市场导报》2024年第7期41-56,共16页Securities Market Herald
摘 要:本文将股东大会全面网络投票制度作为“准自然实验”,采用2010—2020年沪深A股数据实证检验数字赋能下股东监督对管理层操纵行为的影响。研究发现:(1)股东大会全面网络投票制度能够有效约束管理层操纵语调行为,表现出“成本效应”强于“收益效应”的特征,该结论在一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立;(2)股东大会全面网络投票制度具有数字监督特性,能够通过畅通信息传递、提升治理效率增加管理层操纵语调的成本,进而限制其语调操纵行为;(3)对审计质量较差、融资约束较大、政治关联度较低、机构投资者持股比例较小的企业,以及地方国企和非国企,股东大会全面网络投票制度对管理层语调操纵行为的约束更明显;(4)数字赋能股东监督的长期效应表现为先“收益效应”主导、后“成本效应”主导的规律。本文结论对积极创新数字监督模式、有效防范企业违规行为具有重要意义。This paper uses the comprehensive online voting system for shareholders’meetings as a quasi-natural experiment to empirically examine the impact of shareholder supervision on management manipulation behavior under digital empowerment,using the data of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2020.The findings are summarized as follows.(1)The comprehensive online voting system for shareholders’meetings effectively restrains managerial tone manipulation behavior,exhibiting a feature where the“cost effect”outweighs the“benefit effect.”This conclusion holds after a series of robustness tests.(2)The comprehensive online voting system for shareholders’meetings has the characteristic of digital supervision,which increases the cost of managerial tone manipulation behavior by facilitating information transmission and improving governance efficiency,thereby restricting managerial tone manipulation behavior.(3)The constraint effect of the comprehensive online voting system for shareholders’meetings is more pronounced for enterprises with poorer audit quality,higher financing constraints,lower political connections,and lower institutional investor ownership,as well as for local state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.(4)The long-term impact of digital empowerment on shareholder supervision follows a pattern where the“benefit effect”dominates initially,followed by the“cost effect.”The conclusions of this paper are of significant importance for actively innovating digital supervision models and effectively preventing corporate misconduct.
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