董事高管责任保险与真实盈余管理——基于凸显效应  

Directors'and officers'liability insurance and real earnings management:Based on the salience effect

作　　者：屈伸 陈朝龙[1] 陈宁 陈璐[1,2] QU Shen;CHEN Chaoong;CHEN Ning;CHEN Lu(School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China;China Academy of Corporate Governance of Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2024年第4期88-103,共16页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72072019)。

摘　　要：过往文献较少考虑董事高管责任保险与真实盈余管理的关系。本文基于2009—2020年中国A股上市公司数据研究发现,处于发展期的董事高管责任保险(简称“董责险”)负向影响真实盈余管理,且上述关系经过一系列稳健性检验依旧存在。本文基于外部监督视角进一步分析发现:(1)认购董责险可以吸引媒体关注,进而负向影响真实盈余管理。(2)认购董责险可以减少分析师关注;分析师关注可以减少真实盈余管理;分析师关注在董责险与真实盈余管理的负向关系中起着正向遮掩效应。(3)在董责险与真实盈余管理的关系中,保险公司监督中介效应并不显著。公司的弱治理情境与董责险所处的发展阶段,使得中国的董责险治理在真实盈余管理层面“柳暗花明”。这给予了中国保险业与其他企业以发展启示,对于中国等发展中国家引进国外保险等治理举措具有借鉴意义。本文为董责险与盈余管理的研究提供了新的分析视角和经验证据,在一定程度上也体现了弱治理情境的优势。Changes in the external environment increase risks for managers and enterprises.Therefore,to reduce the impact of external risks,improve risk tolerance,and gain a comparative advantage,managers and enterprises often use earnings management and other means to smoothen profit and manage risk.Insurance can replace the improper methods of risk management used by enterprises and improve the efficiency of risk management.Directors′and officers′liability insurance(D&O insurance)refers to an insurance in which firm management is held accountable for misconduct while performing its duties,and the insurance company is responsible for the consequences of the managers′actions.Since insurance is the subject matter of the decision-makers and executors of corporate earnings management,the relationship between D&O insurance and earnings management has always attracted a lot of attention from scholars.However,most of the literature uses data from developed countries and yields conflicting evidence.On the one hand,D&O insurance can play a role in risk incentives and external supervision in reducing earnings management,and on the other hand,it triggers moral hazard and opportunistic behavior,thereby aggravating earnings manipulation.This lack of consensus in the literature has also attracted the attention of many researchers.However,the literature has mainly focused on accrual earnings management.Because of the excellent concealment,strong controllability,lower litigation risk,and greater operating space,real earnings management(REM)has become the main method of corporate earnings management.Compared with accrual earnings management,REM is,theoretically,the least likely case in the research of D&O insurance and earnings management.In the literature,the relationship between D&O insurance and earnings management mainly focuses on external supervision and moral hazard hypotheses.External supervision is more difficult to observe and cannot influence REM due to its strong concealment.Moreover,managers with opportunistic motives ar

关 键 词：董事高管责任保险 盈余管理 行为信号理论 公司治理 弱治理情境 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F84[经济管理—国民经济]