超额薪酬对高管机会主义减持的影响:权力体现还是能力体现?  

Impact of Excess Pay on the Decision for Executives to Engage in Opportunistic Selling:Power or Talent?

作　　者：陈作华[1] 方红星 Chen Zuohua;Fang Hongxing

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,250014 [2]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,116025

出　　处：《会计研究》2023年第11期93-104,共12页Accounting Research

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2022MG038);财政部会计名家培养工程(2018)的资助。

摘　　要：基于2007-2021年中国A股上市公司数据,本文实证检验了超额薪酬对高管机会主义减持的影响。研究发现,超额薪酬驱动了高管机会主义减持,信息机制和风险机制是重要的作用机制,超额薪酬抑制了信息效率、加剧了市场风险,进而为高管机会主义减持提供了机会。横截面检验发现,超额薪酬对高管机会主义减持的正向影响在高管权力较大的公司更显著,在机构投资者退出威胁较大时受到了显著的抑制,高管能力则没有产生显著的影响,结果支持了“权力体现”假说。进一步检验发现,获得负向超额薪酬的高管减持时择机性较差,佐证了“权力体现”假说。本研究不仅有助于全面认识超额薪酬的经济后果,还有助于监管当局对高管机会主义减持行为实施精准监管,对于维护资本市场健康发展具有积极意义。Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021,this paper empirically tests the impact of excess pay on execu-tive opportunistic selling.The research found that the excess pay drove executive opportunistic selling,and the information mechanism and risk mechanism were important mechanisms.The excess pay improved the synchronization of stock prices,exacerbated the company's market risk,and thus provided op-portunities for executive opportunistic selling.The cross-sectional test found that the positive impact of excess pay on executive opportunistic selling was more pronounced in companies with more executives'power,significantly inhibited when the exit threat of institutional investors was greater,and executives'ability did not have a significant impact.The results supported the power hypothesis.Further tests found that executives who received negative excess pay had poor timing of shareholding selling,which also supported the power hypothesis.This study not only helps to fully understand the economic consequences of excess pay and the importance of pay equity,but also helps the supervisory authorities to implement more precise supervision for the exec-utive opportunistic selling,which is of positive significance for maintaining the healthy development of the capital market.

关 键 词：超额薪酬 高管减持 机会主义 权力 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F272.92