电动汽车动力电池制造商混合渠道回收模式选择与碳减排决策  

Selection of Hybrid Channel Recycling Modes and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions for the Electric Vehicle Battery Manufacturer

作　　者：张川[1] 田雨鑫 崔梦雨 Chuan Zhang;Yuxin Tian;Mengyu Cui(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第6期184-195,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19GBL229)。

摘　　要：本文研究电动汽车动力电池制造商在碳配额交易政策下的回收模式选择与碳减排策略,提出了四种混合渠道回收模式:(1)制造商和零售商共同回收;(2)制造商和第三方回收商共同回收;(3)零售商和第三方回收商共同回收;(4)制造商、零售商和第三方回收商共同回收。运用Stackelberg博弈模型求解不同模式下各成员最优定价决策、最优利润和制造商碳减排决策,并对均衡结果进行分析。研究结果表明,制造商最优碳减排水平随初始碳排放量增加而降低,随碳减排投资成本系数增加而降低,随单位碳交易价格的增加呈现先上升后下降再上升的趋势;当回收价格敏感系数高于特定阈值且回收竞争系数低于特定阈值时,制造商最优回收模式为制造商、零售商和第三方回收商共同回收,否则,制造商最优回收模式为制造商与零售商共同回收或者制造商与第三方回收商共同回收。The rapid adoption of electric vehicles(EVs)in China has led to a substantial number of power battery retirements.Establishing an efficient recycling mechanism for these spent power batteries is of pivotal importance.It delves into the selection of recycling modes and the determination of carbon abatement strategies within a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)governing EV power batteries,operating under the carbon cap-and-trade policy.Four hybrid channel recycling modes are proposed:(1)joint recycling involving the manufacturer and the retailer;(2)joint recycling involving the manufacturer and the third-party recycler;(3)joint recycling involving the retailer and the third-party recycler;(4)joint recycling involving the manufacturer,the retailer,and the third-party recycler.The Stackelberg game model is employed to derive optimal pricing decisions,maximum profits,and carbon emission reduction strategies for different modes.A comparative analysis of optimal profits across distinct modes is performed.In addition,an exhaustive exploration of the influences of pivotal parameters on equilibrium outcomes is conducted.The results show that the optimal carbon emission reduction level for the manufacturer decreases with increasing initial carbon emissions,decreases with a higher carbon emission reduction investment coefficient,and exhibits an initial rise followed by a decline and then another rise with increasing unit carbon trading price.When the sensitivity coefficient of the recycling price exceeds a specific threshold and the competition coefficient of recycling falls below another threshold,the optimal recycling mode for the manufacturer involves joint participation of the manufacturer,the retailer,and the third-party recycler.Otherwise,the optimal recycling mode for the manufacturer includes joint participation by the manufacturer and the retailer,or by the manufacturer and the third-party recycler.The total collecting quantity of retired power batteries in the CLSC diminishes as the competitive coefficient of recycling

关 键 词：碳限额与交易政策 动力电池 闭环供应链 碳减排 混合渠道回收 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]