需求信息私有制造商动态定价与零售商战略库存  

Dynamic Pricing of Manufacturer Owning Demand Information Privately and Strategic Inventory of Retailer

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作  者:经有国[1] 宋楗 秦开大[1] 任君玲 JING Youguo;SONG Jian;QIN Kaida;REN Junling(Faculty of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming,Yunnan 650093,China;College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing,Jiangsu 211106,China)

机构地区:[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明650093 [2]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106

出  处:《工业工程与管理》2024年第3期181-191,共11页Industrial Engineering and Management

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(72261022,72261023,72262022);教育部人文社会科学基金项目(21YJC630049;18YJA630089);云南省基础研究计划面上项目(2019FB087);昆明理工大学哲学社会科学科研创新团队项目(CXTD2023003)。

摘  要:针对市场规模为制造商私有信息的情形,建立制造商与零售商的两周期动态博弈模型,研究制造商的动态定价策略和零售商的订货与战略库存行为。将制造商第一周期批发价格分为较高、中等和较低定价水平,研究表明:零售商在较高定价水平条件下不存在订货行为,在中等定价水平条件下存在订货行为但不考虑战略库存,仅在较低定价水平条件下存在战略库存行为;若制造商批发价格为较低或中等定价水平,则零售商在实际市场规模较小的条件下必会产生销售剩余库存。实际市场规模越大,制造商抑制战略库存的意愿越强,但并不会完全消除零售商的战略库存。最大市场规模越大,零售商持有战略库存的意愿越强,且零售商第一周期末的库存可能会满足两周期的销售。最后通过数值分析验证了相关结论的正确性和有效性。For the situations where the market size was private information for the manufacture,a two-period dynamic game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was established to study the manufacturer's dynamic pricing strategy and the retailer's ordering and strategic inventory behavior.The manufacturer's wholesale price strategies in the first period were divided into high,medium,and low pricing levels.The result shows that the retailer does not order under high pricing level.Under medium pricing level,the retailer has ordering behavior without considering strategic inventory.The strategic inventory will only occur under the condition of low pricing level.If the manufacturer's wholesale price is not at the high pricing level,the retailer will inevitably generate sales surplus inventory when the actual market size is small.The larger the actual market size,the stronger the willingness of the manufacturer to suppress strategic inventory.However,the manufacturer may stillinduce the retailer to hold strategic inventory.The larger the largest market size,the greater the wilingness of the retailer to hold strategic inventory.But when both the largest market size and the actual market size are within a relatively small threshold range,the retailer's inventory may meet its sales for two periods.Finally,numerical analysis verified the correctness and validity of the relevant conclusions.

关 键 词:供应链 信息不对称 动态定价 战略库存 

分 类 号:F272[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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