霍菲尔德权利概念释义之质疑  

Oppugning the Interpretation of Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights

作　　者：张恒山 Zhang Hengshan

机构地区：[1]天津大学法学院

出　　处：《法学》2024年第7期3-14,共12页Law Science

基　　金：研究阐释党的十九届六中全会精神国家社会科学基金重大项目“弘扬社会主义法治精神”(项目号:22ZDA072)阶段性研究成果之一。

摘　　要：霍菲尔德对权利概念的释义存在两个问题:其一,用义务解释权利,但因对义务理解不当以致对权利解释不当。其二,用一个具体的、物理性的主体行为,即“要求(claim)”解释抽象的、精神性的“权利(right)”概念。无论是在当代世界人权法文件的经典权利表述句式中,还是在霍菲尔德设计的权利表述句式中,“claim”都不能在替代“right”的同时保持句子语义不变,这说明“权利(right)”和“要求(claim)”的含义不应等同。同样,霍菲尔德对“right/claim”和“privilege”作切割性解释,既破坏了通常使用的“权利(right)”概念内涵的完整性,也不符合思维逻辑。霍菲尔德对权利概念的解释并未使理解权利变得更加简明,而是使理解权利变得更加繁奥。Hohfeld’s interpretation of the concept of rights contains two flaws.Firstly,he utilized obligations to explain rights,but he misinterpreted rights due to an improper understanding of obligations.Secondly,he used a specific,physical subject behavior,namely“claim”,to elucidate the abstract,metaphysical concept of“right”.Whether in the classical syntactic structure of sentences found in contemporary human rights law documents or in the syntactic structure of rights designed by Hohfeld,it is impossible to substitute“claim”for“right”while keeping the semantics of the sentence unchanged.This demonstrates the distinction between“claim”and“right”.Hohfeld’s disjunctive interpretation of“right”or“claim”and“privilege”destroys the integrity of the connotation of the concept of“right”that we usually use and deviates from logical reasoning.Hohfeld’s interpretation of the concept of rights does not facilitate a simpler understanding of rights;instead,it introduces additional complexity.

关 键 词：霍菲尔德 权利 义务 要求 

分 类 号：D909.1[政治法律—法学理论]