高管薪酬追回与上市公司违规  

Clawback Provisions and Corporate Violations

作　　者：张博[1] 张熙萌 周瑞雪 耿和钰 平帆 Zhang Bo

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,100872 [2]暨南大学管理学院,510632 [3]南京审计大学会计学院,211815

出　　处：《会计研究》2024年第4期80-97,共18页Accounting Research

摘　　要：高管薪酬追回指的是在某些特定事件发生后,公司有权追回已发放高管薪酬的制度。本文以2006-2020年中国上市公司为样本,手工整理了公司实施高管薪酬追回制度的数据,实证检验了高管薪酬追回制度的实施对上市公司违规行为的影响。研究结果表明,高管薪酬追回能够有效地抑制公司违规行为。这一发现在经过缓解内生性问题及其他稳健性检验后仍保持不变。在进一步研究中,本文发现高管薪酬追回制度对于非国有企业违规的抑制作用更为显著。此外,本文还探究了公司内外部约束机制对高管薪酬追回制度与公司违规行为关系的影响。结果发现,当公司内部控制质量更低,地区法律环境更好时,高管薪酬追回制度对公司违规的治理作用更强。本文的研究不仅揭示了高管薪酬追回制度在中国上市公司治理中的重要角色,而且为企业治理实践提供了有价值的参考。Clawback provisions refer to the policy which allows firms to recoup compensation from corporate executives following certain specific events.Using hand-collected data,this study examines the effect of clawback provisions in executive compensation contratcs on firm violations among Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2020.We find that clawback provisions can effectively inhibit corporate violations.The results hold under a variety of endogeneity tests and robustness tests.Furthermore,we find that the impact of clawback provisions on firm violations is pronounced in non-state owned enterprises.We also find the impact of clawback provisions on firm violations is more significant in firms with weaker internal controls and firms in regions with better legal environments.This study sheds light on the critical role of clawback provisions in corporate governance and offers valuable insights for practice.

关 键 词：高管薪酬追回 公司治理 公司违规 风险控制 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]