基于演化博弈的城市公共交通出行激励机制研究  

Research on Incentive Mechanism for Urban Public Transportation Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：惠晨曦 朱从坤[1] HUI Chenxi;ZHU Congkun(School of Civil Engineering,Suzhou University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215011,China)

机构地区：[1]苏州科技大学土木工程学院,江苏苏州215011

出　　处：《物流科技》2024年第14期47-51,共5页Logistics Sci-Tech

摘　　要：外部环境机制作为影响交通出行方式选择的要因,在交通流转移、缓解交通拥堵问题中起至关重要的作用。将激励机制引入公共交通管理机制,运用演化博弈的理论建立以出行人群和轨交公司为主体的复制动态方程,探索采用激励机制下主体双方的演化路径和演化规律,并应用Matlab对演化结果进行数据仿真验证。均衡点稳定性分析和仿真结果表明:合理的激励机制能够有效引导交通流转移至公共交通网络。同时,交通管理部门的监管程度与轨交公司的策略选择、外界社会的关注程度与出行人群的策略选择这两组变量之间有正相关性。As a crucial factor affecting the choice of travel mode,external environmental mechanisms play a vital role in traffic flow diversion and alleviating traffic congestion.Introducing incentive mechanisms into public transportation management mechanisms,using evolutionary game theory to establish a replicated dynamic equation with the travel population and rail transit companies as the main body,exploring the evolutionary paths and laws of both parties under incentive mechanisms,and applying Matlab to verify the evolutionary results through data simulation.The stability analysis of equilibrium points and simulation results indicate that a reasonable incentive mechanism can effectively guide traffic flow to transfer to the public transportation network.At the same time,there is a positive correlation between the level of supervision by the transportation management department and the strategic choices of rail transit companies,as well as the level of attention from the outside society and the strategic choices of the traveling population.

关 键 词：出行方式选择 演化博弈论 激励机制 公共交通管理 

分 类 号：F572[经济管理—产业经济]