道德心的开放性——儒家心灵哲学的两种范式及其超越  

The openness of moral mind:two paradigms and their transcendence in Confucian mind philosophy

作　　者：李海超 LI Hai-chao

机构地区：[1]南京大学马克思主义学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《东南大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第4期15-24,150,共11页Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“先秦儒家伦理的情感逻辑研究”(19BZX115)阶段性成果之一。

摘　　要：儒家心灵哲学中存在两种道德心范式,一种是以孔孟儒学为代表的“道德规范型”范式,一种是以宋明理学为代表的“道德本体型”范式。前者将道德心看作形而下的有限心,因而对认识心、情感心具有相对较强的开放性。后者将道德心或性提升到了绝对本体的高度,因而对认识心、情感心产生了相对的封闭性。牟宗三的“良知坎陷”说,试图通过“道德本体型”范式的内部调适实现道德心对认识心的充分开放,但因不能从根本上改变“至大无外”的道德心性设定而不能成功。只有回归孔孟儒学,并对其情感本源论和“道德规范型”心灵哲学范式做出当代的阐释,才能实现道德心向认识心、向现代性价值观念和生活方式的充分开放。Confucian mind philosophy encompasses two moral mind paradigms:the“ethical normative”paradigm represented by Confucianism and the“ethical ontological”paradigm represented by Neo-Confucianism.The former regards moral mind as a limited entity in a transcendent dimension,thereby exhibiting a relatively high level of openness toward cognitive and affective elements.In contrast,the latter elevates moral mind or nature to the heightened status of an absolute ontology,leading to a relatively closed disposition towards cognitive and affective elements.Mou Zongsan’s theory of“conscience pitfall”attempts to achieve the full openness of moral mind towards cognitive elements through internal adjustments within the“ethical ontological”paradigm.However,he fails to alter the essential setting of moral mind as“vast without boundaries,”thus proving ineffective.Only through a return to Confucianism,coupled with a contemporary interpretation of its theory of affective origins and its paradigm,can the full openness of moral mind towards cognitive elements and modern ethical values and lifestyles be attained.

关 键 词：道德心 心灵的开放性 儒家心灵哲学 道德本体型 道德规范型 

分 类 号：B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学]