供需两侧低碳政策下汽车制造商价格博弈非线性演化研究  

Research on Nonlinear Evolution of Automobile Manufacturers' Price Game under Low-carbon Policy of Supply and Demand Side

作　　者：赵丹 郑芳悦 薛婉婷 ZHAO Dan;ZHENG Fang-yue;XUE Wan-ting(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Ma'anshan 243032,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学管理科学与工程学院,马鞍山243032

出　　处：《价值工程》2024年第23期4-6,共3页Value Engineering

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKQ2020D14)。

摘　　要：在汽车市场新旧动能转换阶段,本文考虑供需两侧不同产业政策背景,基于有限理性建立了动态Bertrand博弈模型,并将积分交易价格、碳税额、碳普惠收益等低碳政策因素纳入模型,分析其复合牵引作用。结果表明:(1)供给侧双积分和碳税政策的叠加应分阶段实行,现阶段两项政策若同时实施则太过于激进,不利于汽车市场全面发展。(2)需求侧碳普惠政策对于汽车市场新旧动能转换阶段的影响作用存在差异,因此政策的实施力度应根据市场情况进行动态调整。In the transition phase of new and old driving forces in the automotive market,this paper considers the different industrial policy backgrounds on both supply and demand sides.A dynamic Bertrand game model is established based on bounded rationality,and incorporate low-carbon policy related factors such as credit trading prices,carbon tax amounts,and carbon inclusive benefits into the model.It also analyzes their combined traction.The results show that:(1) The superposition of supply-side double credit policy and carbon tax policy should be implemented in stages.At present,if the two policies are implemented at the same time,they will be too radical,which is not conducive to the all-round development of the automobile market.(2) The impact of demand side carbon inclusive policies on the transition stage of new and old driving forces in the automotive market varies,so the implementation of policies should be dynamically adjusted according to market conditions.

关 键 词：价格竞争 双积分政策 低碳政策 非线性演化 混沌控制 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]