明代的军事动员:个人与国家的相处之道  

Military Mobilization and State-society Interaction in Ming Dynasty China

作　　者：宋怡明 海鹏(译) Michael A.Szonyi(Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations,Harvard University,USA)

机构地区：[1]哈佛大学东亚语言文明系,美国 [2]不详

出　　处：《北京大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第4期72-81,共10页Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：明朝士兵的政治行为是他们与明朝的军户制度互动的产物,这种互动同时又深刻影响了士兵的更广义的社会关系。虽然军户制度的最初设计是让军户家庭下一代中的长男子承父业,达到为国家源源不断输送兵员的效果,但现实是各个家庭都有不尽相同的“生长”方式。从不同例子可以看出,运用制度套利的不同策略,有随机应变的特点。明代以来形成的以祖先崇拜为核心的家族抱团的社会形态,并不是自古以来就有的。明代户籍制度的产生逻辑,是亲族关系与财政义务的二元互动的结果。同时,亲族关系也不是一种文化的必然,它的存在也体现着一种政治上的利害关系。制度套利的历史对中国转型进入现代有深刻的影响。而只有关注这样的日常政治,把明朝作为全球史和比较史中的一部分来研究,才有可能成为事实。For much of the Ming Dynasty(1368-1644),the chief form by which the state obtained military labor was the system of military households(军户).The military household was a hereditary designation requiring the provision of one able-bodied soldier at all times.Households belonging to the category developed a wide range of strategies to fulfill their obligation,including monetizing it and hiring a soldier from outside the household.Because the system required groups of kin to coordinate with one another,it encouraged the development of corporate lineages.This perspective reinforces existing research showing that the corporate lineage is not a timeless,eternal expression of Chinese culture but rather a historically contingent form of social organization.Military households also strategized to use their status as military households to gain advantages in broader social arenas.Their strategies correspond closely to the modern concept of regulatory arbitrage.

关 键 词：军事动员 明代 军户 卫所 

分 类 号：K248[历史地理—历史学]