高管变更对国有企业负债水平的影响研究  

A Research on the Impact of Executive Change on the Debt Level of State-Owned Enterprises

作　　者：刘云华 任广乾[2,3] Liu Yunhua;Ren Guangqian

机构地区：[1]中共郑州市委党校,河南郑州450042 [2]郑州大学公共管理博士后科研流动站,河南郑州450001 [3]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《河南社会科学》2024年第8期93-104,共12页Henan Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“政府激励行为下混合所有制改革的模式选择及治理机制优化研究”(22AGL017);中国博士后科学基金第17批特别资助项目“政府激励行为下国有资本参股对创新链构建的影响机量及优化研究”(2024T170248);中国博士后科学基金第74批面上资助项目“政府激励行为下逆向混改对供应链韧性的影响研究”(2023M741072)。

摘　　要：国有企业负债水平较高受到了较多的关注,研究国有企业高负债现象的成因和治理,对降低国有企业负债水平、保障经济平稳运行具有重要意义。以2013—2020年我国A股上市国有企业为研究样本,实证检验了地方政府领导干部更替、国有企业高管变更以及地方国有企业负债水平三者之间的关系。研究结果表明:在晋升压力的作用下,地方政府领导干部更替提高了国有企业的负债水平,其中国有企业高管变更发挥了中介传导作用。地方政府领导干部任期小于三年会给国有企业带来较大的不确定性,领导干部临近退休时对国有企业的干预意愿会降低。地方政府领导干部主要是通过增大短期负债的比重来提高国有企业的负债规模。国有企业的混合所有制程度越高,地方政府领导干部更替对国有企业负债水平的消极影响就越低。研究结论从微观政企关系角度完善了国有企业高负债的理论和动因基础,为国有企业的长期稳定发展提供了借鉴和参考。The high debt level of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)has been received more attention.It is of great significance to study the causes and governance of the high debt of SOEs to reduce the debt level and ensure the smooth operation of the economy.This paper takes China’s A-share listed state-owned enterprises from 2013 to 2020 as a research sample,and empirically tests the relationship among the turnover of local government officials,the change of state-owned enterprise executives,and the debt level of SOEs.The results show that,under the effect of promotion pressure,the turnover of local government officials increases the debt level of SOEs,and the change of state-owned enterprise executives plays a mediating role.Combined with the individual characteristics of officials,it is found that local government officials whose tenure is less than 3 years will bring greater uncertainty to state-owned enterprises,and As officials approach retirement,their willingness to intervene in state-owned enterprises will decrease.Further research on the debt of SOEs around the debt maturity found that local government officials mainly increase the debt scale of SOEs by increasing the proportion of short-term debt.At the same time,combined with the research on mixed ownership reform,it is found that the higher the degree of mixed ownership of SOEs,the lower the negative impact of the replacement of local government officials on the debt level of SOEs.The research conclusion of this paper improves the theoretical and motivational basis of the high debt of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of the micro-government-enterprise relationship,and provides a reference for the long-term and stable development of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：国有企业 高管变更 负债水平 中介效应 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]