“碳中和”目标下企业绿色核心技术创新策略研究——基于SD演化博弈分析  

Study on the Enterprises Green Core Technology Innovation Strategies under“Carbon Neutrality”--Based on SD Evolutionary Game Analysis

作　　者：任志涛 李家金 罗磊 REN Zhitao;LI Jiajin;LUO Lei(School of Economics and Management,Tianjin Chengjian University,Tianjin 300384,China)

机构地区：[1]天津城建大学经济与管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《科技与经济》2024年第4期36-40,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目——“环境治理公私合作共生网络形成机理及管控机制”(项目编号:17YJA630082,项目负责人:任志涛)成果之一。

摘　　要：运用前景理论,构建企业与学研方绿色核心技术创新合作策略的动态演化博弈模型,采用系统动力学数值仿真模拟博弈双方决策过程,探究企业与学研方博弈的影响机理。结果表明,博弈双方初始合作意愿和政府补贴价值感知对企业绿色核心技术创新具有正向促进作用,双方参与合作成本价值感知具有负向调节作用。最后提出增强企业社会声誉价值、规制核心技术合作及拓展政府绿色补偿渠道的对策建议,为企业提供进行绿色核心技术创新的有利条件。A dynamic evolutionary game model was constructed using prospect theory to explore the strategies for green core technology innovation cooperation between enterprises and research institutions.Numerical simulation was conducted by using system dynamics to simulate the decision-making process of both parties,and explore the impact mechanism of the game.The results indicate that the initial willingness of both parties to cooperate and the perception of government subsidies have a positive promoting effect on the green core technology innovation of enterprises,while the perceived cost value of cooperation between both parties has a negative moderating effect.Finally,countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to enhance the social reputation value of enterprises,regulate core technology cooperation,and expand government green compensation channels,providing favorable conditions for green core technology innovation for enterprises.

关 键 词：碳中和 绿色核心技术创新 前景理论 价值感知 SD演化博弈 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] X322[经济管理—国民经济]